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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - E ERCISE OF POLICE PowER - REGULATORY STATUTE
RESTRICTING SALES OF NEW MERCHANDISE AT AUCTION HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
- Appellee Gilbert, at large under bond after arrest on charge of having conducted
an auction sale without first securing a license and posting a bond, as required by
the "New Goods Public Auction Act," 1 obtained a judgment declaring the law
invalid because repugnant to both state and federal constitutions. The bond re-
quired was to be for twice the value of any new merchandise to be sold at auction.
The Kansas Supreme Court, affirming the trial court over the county attorney's
contention that the act was a valid exercise of the state police power to prevent
frauds and abuses, held: The act contains arbitrary classifications, prohibits the
conduct of a lawful business by the imposition of unreasonable and confiscatory
regulations, and amounts to a denial of due process and equal protection to persons
subject to its operation. Gilbert v. Mathews, 186 Kan. 672, 352 P.2d 58 (1960).
It has long been common to impose restrictions and regulations on itinerant
merchants. 2 The evils intended to be curtailed by legislatures in imposing such
restrictions arise from the itinerant status of such merchants, a status which is to
some extent inimical to the interests of the general public and of permanently
established merchants who are open to injury from unfair competition. This was
recognized in Attorney General v. Tongue:
The object of the legislature in passing the act upon which this informa-
tion is founded was, to protect, on the one hand, fair traders, particularly
established shopkeepers, resident permanently in towns or other places, and
paying rent and taxes there, for local privileges, from the mischiefs of
being undersold by itinerant persons, to their injury; and, on the other, to
guard the public from the impositions practiced by such persons in the
course of their dealings; who, having no known or fixed residence, carry on a
trade by means of vending goods conveyed from place to place by horse
or cart.
3
Occupations "affected with a public interest," even though legitimate in themselves,
are familiar subjects of regulations through the valid exercise of the state police
power.
4
Certain common features are characteristic of all such legislation. As a gen-
eral rule, there are requirements to be fulfilled before a license is granted, and that
license is the lever by which the regulations are enforced. An itinerant merchant's
failure to obtain a license before attempting to carry on business is usually punish-
able by fine, imprisonment, or both. 5 The most common requirement is the pay-
ment of license fees in varying amounts, either on a day by day,6 or a longer (e.g.,
quarterly), basis. 7 Inventories of goods to be sold and other data necessary for
1 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-1001 to -1013 (Supp. 1957).
2 See Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296 (1895).
3 12 Price 51, 60, 147 Eng. Rep. 653, 655-56 (Ex. 1823).
4 Gilbert v. Mathews, 186 Kan. 672, 352 P.2d 58 (1960). It should be noted that no
distinction will be drawn between legislation governing auctioneers, transient or resident, and
legislation governing itinerant merchants alone. The basic question in each class is whether
or not the legislature, in making classifications for regulatory purposes, acted upon a basis
in fact, and whether or not the regulations imposed operate equally upon the members of
the group and show a relation to their purpose. Compare Commonwealth v. Crowell, 156
Mass. 215, 30 N.E. 1015 (1892) (itinerant merchant), with Biddles, Inc. v. Enright, 239 N.Y.
354, 146 N.E. 625 (1925) (auctioneer), and Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. Countryman, 247 Iowa
923, 77 N.W.2d 15 (1956) (itinerant auctioneer). In Commonwealth v. Ober, 66 Mass.
(12 Cush.) 493, 497 (1853), Chief Justice Shaw said:
We consider this as wholly an internal commerce, which the states have a
right to regulate, and, in this respect, this law stands on the same footing,
with the laws regulating sales of wine and spirits, sales at auction, and very
many others, which are in force and constantly acted upon. (Emphasis
added.)
5 ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-2401 to -2416 (1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121Y2, §§ 158-65
(Smith-Hurd 1960); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 42-410 to -421 (Supp. 1960); IowA CoDE ANN.
§§ 546A.1-.9 (Supp. 1960).
6 City of Carrollton v. Bazzette, 159 Ill. 284, 42 N.E. 837 (1896).
7 State v. Foster, 22 R.I. 163, 46 Atl. 833 (1900).
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personal property tax assessment are often demanded." Surety bonds or special
deposits of money to satisfy causes of action brought pursuant to sales and to pay
delinquent taxes are customary,9 as are directives affecting specific commodities,
i.e., regulations covering the sale of drugs"' or the sale of jewelry.",
It often happens that an overzealous legislature prescribes enactments so exces-
sive as to be peculiarly vulnerable to attack in two areas: the selection of the group
of persons to be circumscribed is palpably arbitrary,' 2 or the requirements are so
oppressive as to amount to a practical prohibition of the business."3 The courts
have not been consistent in dealing with legislation of this type; decision necessi-
tates a judgment as to its "reasonableness." Illustrative of this discord is the de-
termination that license fees of ten dollars for every day that a sale is to be held
was excessive,' 4 while another statute calling for a maximum rate of $1,550 for
three months was held valid.' 5 Less disunity is apparent in decisions turning on
the validity of classification. The distinction between transient and resident mer-
chants has long been upheld;"6 but any discrimination between residents and non-
residents of a state is usually overthrown.'
7
The statute dealt with in the principal case is much like others of its kind in
requirements, scope, and operation."' Its operation is limited to itinerant auctioneers
by an exemption section.' 9 It requires licensing, and payment of fees before a sale
may be held. The license is valid only in the county where issued. The act also
demands the filing of data necessary for taxation, and the posting of a bond to be
held for payment of successful claims resulting from sales.
It is plain that the court in Gilbert v. Mathews entertained primarily the
objection that the act was so unreasonable and oppressive as to be an unlawful
restraint, if not a practical prohibition, of trade.2" In order to justify this holding,
it must be shown that the act may in fact so operate.21 The facts relied upon by
8 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 42-410 to -421 (Supp. 1960); IowA CoDE ANN. §§ 546A.1-.9
(Supp. 1960).
9 ARK. STAT. ANN. 8§ 84-2401 to -2416 (1960); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 150.380-.460.
(1949).
10 Baccus v. Louisiana, 232 U.S. 334 (1914).
11 Holsman v. Thomas, 112 Ohio St. 397, 147 N.E. 750 (1925).
12 Little v. Smith, 124 Kan. 237, 257 Pac. 959 (1927).
13 Blauvelt v. Beck, 162 Neb. 576, 76 N.W.2d 738 (1956); but see Steinberg-Baum &
Co. v. Countryman, 247 Iowa 923, 77 N.W.2d 15 (1956); Carlton v. City of Watertown,
207 N.Y. Supp. 338, 342 (1924):
It may be a debatable question whether the evils sought to be remedied will
be cured by this act, or whether the medicine is not too bitter and powerful
a dose for the disease .... The court can step in only when it is clearly
apparent that the law involved is unreasonable and capricious, and when
that question is not fairly debatable.
14 City of Carrollton v. Bazzette, 159 Il. 284, 42 N.E. 837 (1896). This decision was
criticized in City of Lebanon v. Zandition, 75 Kan. 273, 89 Pac. 10 (1907).
15 State v. Foster, 22 R.I. 163, 46 Atd. 833 (1900).
.16 City of Emporia v. Endelman, 75 Kan. 428, 89 Pac. 685 (1907).
17 Brooks v. Managan, 86 Mich. 576, 49 N.W. 633 (1891).
18 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 42-410 to -421 (Supp. 1960); IowA CoDE ANN. §§
546A.1-.9 (Supp. 1960).
19 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-1010 (Supp. 1957).
20 Gilbert v. Mathews, 186 Kan. 672, 352 P.2d 58 (1960).
21 Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. Countryman, 247 Iowa 923, 77 N.W.2d 15 (1956); Cady
v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N.W. 805, 808 (1939):
A statutory determination will not be set aside as denial of equal protection
of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it....
It makes no difference that the facts may be disputed or their effect opposed
by argument and opinion of serious strength. It is not within the compe-
tency of the courts to arbitrate in such a contrariety.
See also Bikle, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional
Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HAnv. L. Rlv. 6, 21 (1924).:
It is hardly necessary to recall the rule that legislation comes to the
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the Gilbert court as indicating oppressiveness are the requirements for filing tax
statements and posting bond, and the authorization contained in the act for incor-
porated cities to enact similar ordinances. The objection to the tax forms is that
logical inconsistencies appear in their function and purpose. A fair reading of the
statute does not indicate that such inconsistencies would lead, in practice, to a
denial of the constitutional rights of any citizen. In themselves, logical flaws are
not sufficient to require the court to invalidate the act,2 2 where a practical construc-
tion, 3 unimpaired by the deficiencies, may be effected. The Gilbert court found
further evidence of the oppressive character of the act in the provision authorizing
municipalities to enact similar regulations. City of Beloit v. Lamborn,24 distin-
guished on its facts by the Gilbert court in favor of an unsubstantiated dictum,
25
upheld such a delegation of authority. It was said in the Lamborn case that the
city, being closer to the problems of possible milk contamination, would be better
able to provide effective measures to alleviate its evils. In attacking the required
bond, the Gilbert court relies heavily on the fact that no surety company in the
state would deal with an auctioneer unless he secured the surety to the full extent
of liability. No consideration is given the plausible view that this might be due
to the solvency of the person seeking the surety, rather than to the nature of the
bond. Further, it is in keeping with the purpose of the act to demand that the
auctioneer guarantee his goods to a greater degree than an established merchant.2 6
Two objections carry somewhat more weight and are not easily dismissed on
the grounds that the court is merely failing to exercise judicial restraint in favor
of the discretion of the legislature. First, the Gilbert court said that the clause in
the exemption section27 covering auction sales by individuals was discriminatory
in that it did not include firms, partnerships, and corporations.2s The only neces-
sary remedy is deletion of the invalidating phrase "by individuals," which would
in effect extend the exemption to the classes desired. This is a warranted construc-
tion,29 merely giving voice to the obvious intent of the legislature as seen in the
saving clause.30 The Iowa legislature used these exact words to restrict the operation
of a similar statute. 1 Later, the opinion of the Iowa Attorney General was that
the word individuals did not extend to partnerships or corporations. 32 The Iowa
legislature immediately amended this section by dropping the phrase "by indi-
viduals." 33
court with the presumption in favor of its constitutional validity. Clearly,
therefore, the litigant who challenges this validity may properly be required
to satisfy the court of the correctness of his position in point of fact.
22 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955):
But the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims
to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction,
and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a
rational way to correct it.
23 Gilbert v. Mathews, 186 Kan. 672, 352 P.2d 58 (1960).
24 182 Kan. 288, 321 P.2d 177 (1958).
25 Blauvelt v. Beck, 162 Neb. 576, 76 N.W.2d 738, 747 (1956), is cited as authority.
An examination of this opinion shows that the statement concerning the confiscatory nature
of dual regulations is made without substantiating authority.
26 Gilbert v. Mathews, 186 Kan. 672, 352 P.2d 58 (1960).
27 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-1010 (Supp. 1957).
The provisions of this act shall not extend to the sale at public auction of
livestock, farm machinery or farm produce or other items commonly sold
at farm sales, or to auction sales by individuals of new merchandise, which
was assessed personal property tax or is replacement stock of merchandise
inventory which was assessed personal property tax in the county in which
the sale is to be had....
28 Gilbert v. Mathews, 186 Kan. 672, 352 P.2d 58 (1960).
29 Rutenberg v. City of Philadelphia, 329 Pa. 26, 196 Atl. 73 (1938).
30 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-1012 (Supp. 1957).
31 IOWA ACTS 1953, ch. 239, § 8.
32 30 Op.. ATT'Y. GEN. 120, 121 (Iowa 1953).
33 IOWA CoDE ANN. § 546A.8 (Supp. 1960).
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The second objection, that the statute explicitly denies due process of law,
could have been handled in like fashion. In section 5 of the act, which deals with
service of process in civil -actions arising out of auction sales, it is provided that
failure to mail a copy of the process to the defendant will not affect the court's
jurisdiction.3 4 This is, admittedly, a denial of due process, a fundamental require-
ment of which is the fair opportunity of every person to be heard in his own de-
fense.3 5 Omission of this sentence would preserve the validity of the act, since
enough substance remains to carry out the legislative intent.38 The same section
provides that the county clerk, the auctioneer's agent for service of process, shall
mail to the auctioneer by ordinary mail a true copy of process. An interpretation
of the word shall in context shows that it is mandatory and not merely directory.n
It is also to be presumed that the clerk will exercise reasonable care in notifying
the auctioneer.38 There can be no objection to the use of ordinary mail, since the
legislature may well have found that, under the circumstances, a communication
not requiring personal signature, as would be the case with registered mail, would
more reasonably assure receipt of notice.3 9
Even though the court calls this particular act "poorly and awkwardly
drawn," 4 0 the necessity for judicial restraint, it is submitted, should have overridden
judicial concern for statutory esthetics. 41 In a Rhode Island case strikingly similar to
this, 42 it was said:
[W]hile it is evident that the burdens imposed by the statute upon the
business aimed at are heavy, and will result in confining it within narrow
limits, we do not feel warranted in saying that the statute is so clearly
prohibitive of a traffic which is in itself lawful as to be unconstitutional.
This statement seems to indicate a sounder judicial deference to the expression of
legislative intent. The Gilbert court lost sight of this spirit, and dispatched a law
designed to combat a definite evil. The holding and dicta in the principal case,
if followed in other jurisdictions, would threaten a precarious imbalance in the
34 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-1005 (Supp. 1957).
35 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950):
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any pro-
ceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
* . . But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is
not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of
actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.
36 People ex rel. Honore v. Olsen, 222 Ill. 117, 78 N.E. 23 (1906).
37 See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-1003 (Supp. 1957): "[The applicant shall
make the application. .. ." KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-1005: "The applicant and
sureties shall appoint the County Clerk as their agent ..... " KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-1008:
"[C]opy of which shall immediately be sent to the Director of Revenue by the Clerk."
(Emphasis added.)
38 Powell v. Knight, 74 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Va. 1947).
39 Jones v. Paxton, 27 F.2d 364 (D. Minn. 1928). Registered mail is primarily an
indemnification for the greater security of valuable mail matter. 39 U.S.C. § 381 (1960).
The chief benefit of the return receipt, as far as the courts are concerned, is its admissibility
as prima facie evidence of delivery. 39 U.S.C. § 388a (1960).
40 Gilbert v. Mathews, 186 Kan. 672, 352 P.2d 58 (1960).
41 Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 569 (1911):
The scope of judicial inquiry in deciding the question of power is not to
be confused with the scope of legislative considerations in dealing with the
matter of policy. Whether the enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is
based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve
the desired result, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within the
prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner, are matters
for the judgment of the legislature, and the earnest conflict of serious
opinion does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cogniz-
ance.
42 State v. Foster, 22 R.I. 163, 46 Atl. 833 (1900). (Severe regulation of itinerant
merchants held valid.)
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function of judiciary and legislature. The weight of authority holds that a legisla-
tive enactment is open to judicial review only if it clearly violates constitutional
guarantees, 43 an attitude which suggests that the remedy for unwise law-making is
to be found in appeal to the legislators, not in indiscriminate use of judicial power.
Philip Byrne
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - FREE SPEECH - CITY ORDINANCE REQUIRING MO-
TION PICTURES TO BE CENSORED PRIOR TO PUBLIC EXHIBITION NOT INVALID AS
VIOLATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT. - Section 155-4 of the Municipal Code of
Chicago prohibits public exhibition of any motion picture in the city unless its
exhibitor first secures a permit from the commissioner of police. The commissioner
is required to issue the permit upon application and payment of a prescribed fee,
unless he determines that the film is objectionable for one or more enumerated
reasons, in which case he is required to refuse to issue the license. The Times Film
Corporation applied for a permit to exhibit a motion picture entitled "Don Juan"
and tendered the license fee, but refused to submit the film to the commissioner
for examination as required by the ordinance. Solely because of this refusal, the
company's request was denied. Times Film then petitioned the federal district court
for an order compelling the city to issue the necessary permit without prior sub-
mission of the film for examination. The petition alleged that the ordinance was
invalid on its face as a prior restraint upon the freedom of speech. On appeal from
a denial of the petition, the United States Supreme Court held: five to four, ordin-
ance requiring the submission of motion pictures to a city official for examination
prior to public exhibition is not void on its face as a prior restraint within the prohi-
bition of the first and 14th amendments. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,
81 S. Ct. 391 (1961).
In Near v. Minnesota,' the Supreme Court, recognizing an historical aversion
to censorship embodied in the first amendment,2 held that the validity of prior
restraints upon the freedom of the press would be recognized only in exceptional
cases. The Near case dealt with newspapers, but subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions extended the prohibition against prior restraints to other means of expression. 3
In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,4 a unanimous court held that expression
by means of motion pictures is protected by the free speech and press guaranties
of the first and 14th amendments. In that case and five subsequent decisions the
court has invalidated exercises of censorship as applied to motion pictures. 5 In
none of those decisions, however, did the court hold that censorship of motion
pictures was banned by its decisions in Near and subsequent censorship cases. In
each, the motion picture involved had been submitted to the censorship authorities
for inspection and a permit had been denied because the film's content had
allegedly violated a statutory standard. For example, in Burstyn, a previously
granted license to exhibit the motion picture "The Miracle," was withdrawn by
the New York authorities because they felt that the film was "sacrilegious." The
43 Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1911).
1 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 E.g., in chronological order: Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Hauge v. C.I.O.,
307 U.S. 496 (1939); Saia v. New York, 343 U.S. 558 (1948); Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290 (1951).
4 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
5 In chonological order: Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952); Superior Films, Inc.
v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Holmby Prod., Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870
(1955); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 356 (1957); Kingsley Picture Corp.
v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); see Note, 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 537 (1960); Note, 33
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 416, 436 (1958).
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court reversed the censors on the ground that the statutory standard applied was
unconstitutionally vague, leaving open the question "whether a state may censor
motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the
showing of obscene films." 6 That question remained open until the Times case.
The arguments of the parties were not set out in any detail in the principal
case. But it appears that the City of Chicago contended that it had a duty to
protect its citizens in the most effective manner from the social dangers consequent
upon obscenity in motion pictures. That duty justified its censoring all motion
pictures.
The Times Film Corporation apparently argued that censorship of any form
of expression, including motion pictures, is invalid as a prior restraint within the
prohibition of the first and 14th amendments. "[E]ven if this film contains the basest
type of pornography . . . it may nonetheless be shown without prior submission
for examination." The city's alternative remedy against obscene motion pictures
is prosecution under the pornography statute.
8
Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, admitted that the Chicago ordin-
ance imposes a prior restraint. As he saw it, the issue before the court was "whether
the ambit of constitutional protection includes complete and absolute freedom to
exhibit at once, any and every kind of motion picture." 9 He reviewed Near and
subsequent decisions to establish three propositions. First, the freedom of speech
and press is not an absolute. Second, not all prior restraints on speech and press
are invalid. Third, obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech and press.
Addressing himself to Times Film's argument that the city's only remedy
against obscene movies was prosecution under the pornography statute, Justice
Clark wrote, "This position is founded upon the claim of absolute privilege against
prior restraint under the First Amendment - a claim without sanction' °
in the cases he had reviewed. To support his point, he cited one of the exceptional
instances which Chief Justice Hughes had enumerated in Near: "The primary
requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications."""
Justice Clark then noted that Chicago had a legitimate interest in protecting
its people from obscene movies. Observing a greater potential for obscenity in
motion pictures than in other forms of expression, he said, "We recognized in
Bursn .. . that motion pictures were not 'necessarily subject -to the precise rules
governing any other particular method of expression.' "12 Then, in apparent answer
to the objection that the city has selected a method of suppressing obscene movies
which impinges most on constitutionally protected speech without any apparent
attempt to devise less drastic means of solving the problem, Justice Clark wrote:
It is not for this Court to limit the State in its selection of the remedy
it deems most effective to cope with such a problem, absent, of course, a
showing of unreasonable strictures on individual liberty resulting from its
application in particular circumstances.' s
The rest of Justice Clark's opinion was devoted to limiting the scope of the
Court's ruling. He stated that the Court was not holding that censorship authori-
ties may be granted power to prevent the showing of any film they find distasteful.
He concluded the opinion by pointing out that the Court was dealing only with
motion pictures and not with other forms of expression.
This comment has dealt with censorship in the context of three Supreme Court
6 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952).
7 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 81 S. Ct. 391 (1961).
8 ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 470 (Smith-Hurd 1935).
9 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 81 S. Ct. 391, 393 (1961).
10 Id. at 394.




decisions. At the risk of oversimplification, the teaching of those cases may be sum-
marized in four rules. Near holds that the validity of censorship will be recognized
only in exceptional cases. Burstyn states that motion pictures are protected by the free
speech and press provisions of the first and fourteenth amendments. Times recog-
nizes that motion pictures may be regulated differently from other forms of expres-
sion. Burstyn and Times both indicate that motion pictures may only be censored
under a clearly drawn statute designed to suppress obscenity. It remains to consider
the wisdom of the Court's decision.
The majority states that Times Film Corporation makes a broadside attack on
the Chicago statute. This is not precisely correct. As the Court notes, Times made
no argument concerning the licensing or the standards. It merely attacks the con-
stitutional right of the Chicago board to see the motion picture before the license
is granted. Perhaps to say "merely" understates the case, but it is significant that
nowhere does the issue of standards arise. The question is more basic: Is the
interest of the state in protecting the public from obscenity of so great a weight that
it may examine any and every film to be shown commercially within its jurisdiction
and pass on their acceptability on standards much broader than obscenity before
the film is shown? This is the question the Court answers. The following facts
are germane to the question:
a) No one had seen the motion picture in question.
b) The challenge was directed to censoring any motion picture, not just obscene
motion pictures.
c) The standards of the statute are nowhere in issue.
The majority proceeds on an ultimately practical investigation. It poses, sub
silentio, two propositions:
a) Every film is potential pornography.
b) It asks little to let the state determine whether a film is pornographic be-
fore it is shown, and it makes less sense to allow one showing of a por-
nographic film and then prosecute under a pornography statute.
It is difficult to argue with the fundamental practicality of these two propo-
sitions. They become questionable only when reduced from abstract logic to
human application and its attendant results. First, the majority cannot properly
cite the numerous statements in landmark cases that pornography has no consti-
tutional protection, since in those cases the pertinent remarks were directed to the
fact that free speech is not without limitations; whereas here the question was how
those limitations were to be imposed. Furthermore, those previous judicial state-
ments were made in a context in which the Court had before it libelous or allegedly
pornographic material. In the Times case the only question was method. The
majority's answer to this is that Chicago may use the "most effective" method. It
does not seem that continual reference to obscenity would justify the most effective
method of prior restraint since it would, perforce, be necessary to restrict all statutes
to an obscenity standard.
This, it must be admitted, does not refute the majority position; the obvious
response is that, when the standard is drawn in issue, the Supreme Court will then
decide that question. That answer, fair and obvious as it may seem, belies the
error of the majority's reliance on cases dealing with obscenity. The issue of ob-
scenity was not before the Times court. Only the device, prior restraint, was at
issue - nothing more. The Court was called upon to decide the validity of prior
restraint; it begs the question to talk about obscenity, since the motion picture in
issue may have been totally devoid of any lascivious material. One cannot coat
the bitter pill of prior restraint with the maxim that the major public concern is
restraint of obscenity.
But what of the attractive practicality of saying that it is senseless to let a
picture be shown once and then prosecute its exhibitors under a pornography
statute? It is submitted, at the outset, that practicality in the abstract is but one
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quality of argument. World affairs often proceed in the face of practicality, on
perfectly valid (and perfectly workable) premises. To say that a rule of law is
unacceptable because it lacks abstract practicality is as incorrect as to say it is
unacceptable because it lacks rhyme scheme. One of the primary avenues to truth
in the judicial order is history; and it seems evident that the practicality of the
majority opinion in Times is no telling argument against the historical argument
of the dissenters. In this sense, the majority and the dissenters do not clash dialec-
tically.
The issue, then, becomes: Given the different position of minority and majority,
which is the more desirable from the point of view of constitutional government?
Stated more concisely, the compelling teaching of history is that prior restraint
does not work to the good of mankind, notwithstanding its virtues of prime effec-
tiveness and practicality, and that its abolition was the intent and purpose of the
framers of the first amendment. The tenor of political thought in this country at
the date of the drafting of the first amendment was averse to prior restraint, even
if there is strong suggestion that subsequent restraint was endorsed. 4 It is a con-
stant principle of constitutional interpretation that the thoughts of the men who
drafted the Constitution are an indication of what the particular words of the
Constitution mean. For example, the right to trial by jury is argued and followed
according to the principles of that institution as it existed in 1789"' It does not
seem unfair to insist that the "legislative history" of the Constitution would sug-
gest an intent to avoid censorship in the sense of prior restraint.
To go further, the idea is often proposed that an attack on the reasonable
principle that a state should be able to examine a film before its showing on the
basis of abuse of the system merely shows that the system may have faults which
can be corrected. For example, to say that the censors will exercise their own
biases is merely to say that one censor is bad and that the state should get another.
In short, criticism of the application of the system is not a valid criticism of the
system itself. The answer to this argument is" that, in the judicial order, the courts
view -things differently. Observe the rule that confessions given during the time
a prisoner is held in illegal detention before he is presented to a magistrate are
inadmissable at trial. The original criticism of holding a prisoner incommunicado
was that third degree methods might be employed. The answer given above would
seem applicable, viz., to point out that abuses should not destroy 'the fact that there
is a confession, and that illegal detention does not destroy the prisoner's right to
a fair trial. However, the Supreme Court has responded that 'the interest in fair
trial is so great, and the possibility of the third degree so obnoxious, that confessions
obtained during that time are inadmissible.' 6 By the same token, the interest in
free speech is so great, and the opportunity for abuse in censorship so probable
and so obnoxious, that the Court should bow to historical evidence and say that
prior restraint, whatever its merits, is inimical to constitutional liberties.
Another difficulty with the majority decision is that it purports to keep alive
the rule in Near v. Minnesota. Apparently that case is distinguished on the grounds
that Near involved newspapers and Times involved motion pictures. The difference
is obvious, but the germane question is whether there is a constitutional difference.
The point is made by the majority that there is a difference between the mediums.
This follows the discussion that obscenity may be restrained; it presumes the wholly
unproven premise that newspapers are any less able to print pornography than
motion pictures are able to show it. It does no good to argue that there are obscene
motion pictures in fact because, as noted before, no one had seen the film in ques-
tion, and furthermore, the decision must refer to any thought whatsoever that is
14 LEvy, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
15 Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
16 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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presented on film. Printed obscenity has caused quite as much concern as obscene
films.17 The motion picture's potentiality for obscenity has no relevance. Since
anything on film may be viewed under the Chicago statute, it does no good to say
that only obscene motion pictures will come within the purview of the censor.
It would seem that the issue comes down to the question of transfer of knowl-
edge from A to B, with the intervention of C as a judge of whether the knowledge
may be received by B. If that is the question, and it is difficult to avoid the con-
clusion that it is, the physical substance on which the words conveying knowledge
are superimposed is immaterial. At the risk of seeming facetious, suppose the
Chicago Tribune is placed on microfilm and used for a commercial course in jour-
nalism. Does the censorship board have a right to pass on it under Times or is it
prevented by Near?
The conclusion is that there is no constitutional difference between newspapers
and films, and that either Near is overruled or the majority has made a distinction
that is without substance.
Thomas Kavadas, Jr.
John R. Martzell
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PERSONAL JURISDICTION - "MINIMUM CONTACTS"
ARISING FROM CONTRACT WITH DOMICILIARY. -Lone Star, a Texas corporation,
entered into a three-year contract with Citroen, a New York corporation, whereby
Lone Star was to become the exclusive distributor of certain makes of automobiles in
several southwestern states. Lone Star claimed that it performed its obligations under
the contract and that Citroen had breached by repudiation. Citroen was served
with process under a Texas statute making amenable to process by substituted
service those who enter "into contract by mail or otherwise with a resident of Texas
to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State." Held: Require-
ments of due process not satisfied. An allegation of a single contract to be per-
formed in whole or in part within the state is insufficient to satisfy the due pro-
cess requirement of minimum contacts with forum state. Lone Star Motor Import,
Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 185 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
In the second case, defendant, a New York manufacturer of children's
swimming suits, was charged with "negligently manufacturing and furnishing a
defective and dangerous bathing suit" resulting in injuries to plaintiff, a three-year
old girl who suffered burns when her suit caught fire after it came in contact with
an automobile cigarette lighter. The suit had been purchased from the J.C. Penney
Co., a chain store with retail outlets in California. J.C. Penney and other chain
stores purchased their swimming suits from defendant through their home offices
in New York. Defendant had no property or bank accounts, nor any officers, em-
ployees, or anyone designated as statutory agent for service of process in California.
Some 20 per cent of its total distribution of goods in the state was the result of
solicitation by independent sales representatives who secured orders from customers
other than J.C. Penney. Orders secured by them were forwarded to New York
where they were accepted and filled. Payments by the customers were made directly
to defendant; the sales representatives participated only on a commission basis.
Service of process was made by mail through the Secretary of State of California,
as provided by statute. The trial court quashed service. On appeal to the California
District Court of Appeal, held: reversed. The defendant was sufficiently "doing
business" within California so as to give the forum state in personam jurisdiction
without violating due process. Thomas v. J.C. Penney Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 721 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1960).
These two cases raise, once again, the question of a state's power to subject non-
17 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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resident, foreign corporations to its jurisdiction and to give in personam judgments
binding upon other state courts under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitu-
tion.' "Jurisdiction of the person," as spoken of here, is "power to subject the parties
in a particular case to the decisions and rulings made... in such case.
' 2
In 1878, the Supreme Court laid down the rule that before a court has personal
jurisdiction over a defendant, he must either be physically present within the forum
or have consented to the court's jurisdiction.3 Mr. Justice Holmes, a generation
later, said that the test for a valid personal judgment was physical power.4 Under
this nation's federal government, the growth of commerce and improved methods
of communication have forced the courts to enlarge on this rule. This they have
done through the traditional legal method of creating fictions. From the power-
over-the-present-person and consent concepts of jurisdiction, it was but a short
step to recognize an implied consent to submit to a state's jurisdiction on the part
of those using a state's highways.5 The extension had been foreshadowed earlier as
to corporations by decisions holding that corporations, though not "persons" of any
but the charter state, could be held to have consented to the jurisdiction of other
states in return for the privilege of doing business there.6 In International Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky,7 the concept that a corporation was "present" where it was doing
business, emerged. Under these theories, the basis of jurisdiction came to revolve
around the quantity of business that a corporation carried on within the forum state.8
In 1945, the Supreme Court, in an effort to give judicial sanction to legitimate
efforts of states to obtain jurisdiction over nonresident corporations which were
either carrying on activities within their borders or affecting their citizens, laid down
the broad but apparently simple rule that "due process requires only that in order
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice.'-9 Thus emerged a qualitative test, rather than a quantitative
one. While it cannot be denied that the exigencies of modem commercial life de-
mand free access to the courts to settle disputes, the language in International Shoe
Co. v. State of Washington'° was hardly adapted to delineating permissible and
forbidden areas of state authority. This was the sort of rule that was capable of
being driven "to the limits of its logic.""-1 Many of the states, in an effort to squeeze
every possible advantage out of the dicta in International Shoe, have enacted
statutes designed to make any and every corporate commercial relation reaching
into the state subject that corporation to in personam jurisdiction. 2 It would appear
1 U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
2 Collins v. Powell, 224 Iowa 1015, 277 N.W. 477 (1938).
3 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
4 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
5 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
6 International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); Lafayette Ins. Co. v.
French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
7 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
8 See Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations - An Analysis of Due Process,
104 U. PA. L. Rnv. 381 (1955); Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corporations Based
On A Single Act: A New Sole For International Shoe, 47 GEORGETOWN L.J. 342 (1958);
Note, Developments In The Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAv. L. REv. 909 (1960).
9 International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
10 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
11 See Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 70 (1947).
12 N.C. GENr. STAT. § 55-145 (1955):
Jurisdiction over foreign corporations not transacting business in this
State. - (a) Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this
State, by a resident of this State or by a person having a usual place of
business in this State, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting
or has transacted business in this State and whether or not it is engaged
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that, if followed literally, some of these statutes would do away with the due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment; indeed, the courts have seen fit to
strike down some of their provisions for this reason.
13
It has often, been debated whether or not a single, isolated incident within the
forum state, or one without the forum state but with a substantial connection with
it, could give rise to an in personam judgment. As already mentioned, the courts
early recognized nonresident motorist statutes, 14 but these have been justified on
the basis that a dangerous instrumentality was involved.' The Supreme Court of
Vermont has ruled that a single contact, out of which arose a tort, was sufficient
to give the forum state jurisdiction" based on the "tortious act" provisions of the
Vermont statute.1 A more difficult problem is presented when the sole contact
gives rise to an action ex contractu and not ex delicto.
In 1957, the Supreme Court ruled that California did not deny defendant,
a Texas insurance company, due process by taking jurisdiction on the basis of an
insurance contract entered into by defendant through the mail with plaintiffs
deceased son.18 Certainly the granting of jurisdiction based on this single contact
could have signaled the eventual demise of jurisdictional limitations for all practi-
cal purposes, but dicta in that case 9 and a 1958 decision of the Supreme Court"
exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising
as follows:
(1) Out of any contract made in this State or to be performed in
this State; or
(2) Out of any business solicited in this State by mail or otherwise
if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders
or offers relating thereto were accepted within or without the State; or
(3) Out of the production, manufacture, or distribution of goods by
such corporation with the reasonable expectation that those goods are
to be used or consumed in this State and are so used or consumed, re-
gardless of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured, mar-
keted, or sold or whether or not through the medium of independent
contractors or dealers; or
(4) Out of tortious conduct in this State, whether arising out of
repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance
or nonfeasance.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956); TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
2031b, § 4 (Supp. 1960); CAL. CoRP. CODE § 6501; MD. ANN. CODE, art. 23, § 92 (1957);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 855 (1958).
13 E.g., Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fiber Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
A North Carolina corporation's agent visited a New York corporation's plant in New York
and placed an order for certain amounts of rayon fiber. This contract was signed in New
York and delivery was FOB New York. Delivery was made and after it was shipped to North
Carolina, P discovered that the fiber was defective. The general manager of the New York
corporation went to North Carolina to discuss the complaint, and while there was served
with process by P. D removed the case to the federal district court and the district court
ruled that this contract in itself was insufficient to give the North Carolina Courts in
personam jurisdiction over the New York corporation. No allegation of other contacts
was made at the trial. The court ruled that due process required more than this meager
association with the state and also that the presence of the general manager within the state
was not in itself sufficient to give North Carolina power over the corporation. The court
apparently struck down the literal meaning of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(3). See Stat. cited
note 12, supra.
14 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
15 Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fiber Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
16 Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951). Com-
mented on in 27 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 117 (1951).
17 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 855 (1958).
18 McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
19 Id at 223: "It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing
effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims."
20 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The Court recognized that economic
factors have changed, making better availability of the courts necessary, but stated (at 251):
[I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of
all restrictions on the personal jUrisdiction of state courts. . . . Those re-
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again reaffirmed the principle that minimum contacts "is not to be understood
in the most literal sense, as though the law's requirement is satisfied by a foot-fall
on the state's soil. The word refers to a relationship through activity deemed sub-
stantial."
21
The Seventh Circuit22 has indicated that Hanson v. DencklaW 3 limited McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co.24 to insurance contracts but it is doubtful if a
blanket statement such as this can be made. What seems most probable is that the
Supreme Court would permit the doctrine of McGee to extend to other activities
that a state had a manifest interest in protecting.
A question concerning jurisdiction necessarily has to revolve on the facts of
each particular casea5 and by its very nature no empirical formula can be laid down
that will ensure uniformity. But since the states insist that their statutes are sy-
nonymous with the power of the state to subject foreign corporations to local
process as regulated by due process considerations, 26 it is important that a more
definitive standard be established by the Supreme Court. One such attempt to
form a working standard has been made and been given judicial recognition by
the Ninth Circuit.27 From a reading of International Shoe, McGee and Hanson,
three rules have been devised to use as a standard in jurisdictional decisions:
(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some
transaction within the forum. It is not necessary that defendant's agent
be physically within the forum, for this act or transaction may be by mail
only. A single event will suffice if its effects within the state are sub-
stantial enough to qualify under Rule Three.
(2) The cause of action must be one which arises out of, or results from,
the activities of the defendant within the forum. It is conceivable that
the actual cause of action might come to fruition in another state, but
because of the activities of defendant in the forum state there would still
be a "substantial minimum contact."
(3) Having established by Rules One and Two a minimum contact be-
tween the defendant and the state, the assumption of jurisdiction based
upon such contact must be consonant with the due process tenets of "fair
play" and "substantial justice." If this test is fulfilled, there exists a "sub-
stantial minimum contact" between the forum and the defendant. The
reasonableness of subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction under this rule
strictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or
distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the
power of the respective States. However minimal the burden of defending
in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless
he has had the "minimal contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite
to its exercise of power over him.
21 Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fiber Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cir. 1956).
22 Trippe Manufacturing Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959).
Plaintiff was an Illinois corporation that manufactured electrical equipment. Defendant was
a New Jersey mail order company that had inquired of plaintiff concerning a small rotat-
ing light called a "welcome light." Defendant returned the sample plaintiff had sent, but
plaintiff claimedd that defendant used the light in a picture in its catalog, which it had
mailed into Illinois. The Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court's ruling that this con-
stituted sufficient minimum contacts. The court held that McGee is not controlling, even
though defendant had corresponded with plaintiff in the state and had mailed its catalogs
into the state.
23 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
24 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
25 Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 338 P.2d 596 (Cal. App. 1959), rev'd, 346
P.2d 409 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 927 (1960).
26 Grobark v. Addo Machine Company, 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959); Henry
R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958).
27 L. D. Reeder Contractors of Arizona v. Higgins Industries, 265 F.2d 768, 775 (9th
Cir. 1959).
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is frequently tested by standards analogous to those of forum non con-
veniens.
2 s
Viewed in the light of the above three rules, it seems improbable that a mere
allegation, in strict conformity with the Texas statute,2 9 without additional sup-
porting data, would be sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. The district
court in Lone Star so ruled; but it would be interesting to have the case appealed
on this issue since other states have similar provisions in their statutes." The Texas
district court faced the "contact of a contract" in the abstract. The district judge
suggests surprise that further contacts were not alleged, since they no doubt existed,
given the extent of the relationship involved in the contract that was alleged. The
McGee case faced a contract in the abstract, but found jurisdiction. It is difficult
to ignore the implication that the contract in McGee, being an insurance contract,
was subject to more than usual control by the state and that this consideration
was determinative.
Since the desire of a state to enforce obligations owed to its residents is not
sufficient grounds to give that state in personam jurisdiction, two implications may
be drawn from the Lone Star Motor case: Either the party alleging jurisdiction
must show a contract plus other contacts, or he must show a contract which is
subject to the special control of a state, such as an insurance contract (or perhaps
a public utilities contract). Before the latter alternative can be accepted, however, it
must be noted that in McGee the plaintiff alleged that premium payments were
mailed from California. This, however, does not appear to eliminate the above
proposition, since the Court did not rely on the premium payments to find juris-
diction and, further, because unilateral performance of the contract by the resident
does not appear to cause the foreign party to have any more contact with the
forum state itself. To Rule (1) above might be added the condition that a bare
contract is not sufficient to create minimum contacts if that contract is not in-
volved in the "public interest" sphere. Lone Star seems to be the first case where
the issue has been squarely in point but it is doubtful that the decision will be
overruled.
28 Note, 47 GEORGETOWN L.J. 342, 351-52 (1958). In L. D. Reeder Contractors of
Arizona v. Higgins Industries, 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959), Judge Barnes quoted from
Mr. Justice Jackson in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), concerning some
of the factors to be weighed under the "forum non conveniens" doctrine (at 775):
Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources
of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling,
and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility
of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility of a
judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages
and obstacles to fair trial .... [P]laintiff may not, by choice of an incon-
venient forum, "vex," "harass," or "oppress" the defendant by inflicting
upon him expenses or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue
his remedy...
Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine....
There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial . . in a
forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case,
rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in con-
flict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.
29 Tzx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 4:
For the purposes of this Act, and without including other acts that
may constitute doing business, any foreign corporation, joint stock com-
pany, association, partnership, or non-resident natural person shall be
deemed doing business in this State by entering into contract by mail or
otherwise with a resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part
by either party in this State, or the committing of any tort in whole
or in part in this State.
30 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a)(1) (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1958).
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If the Penney decision can be squared with Rule (2), above, then there
should be no difficulty in upholding the state's jurisdiction. In Penney, it is ad-
mitted that the business transactions between defendant and Penney were carried
out entirely outside California. The court took jurisdiction on the basis of the
other swimming suit business defendant was transacting in the state. In Shepard v.
Rheem Mfg. Co.,"' a foreign corporation sold home appliances to wholesalers in
North Carolina, title passing outside the state. Plaintiff sustained injuries from a
defective hot water heater that he had purchased from a wholesaler. The court
ruled that defendant corporation was subject to the in personam jurisdiction of
the court.3 2 Reinforced by this decision and also by the fact that the injury in
Penney resulted from the same line of business transactions that defendant other-
wise carried on in California, it certainly is not stretching a point to say that the
tort action resulting from a defectively manufactured suit was one "which arises
out of, or results from, the activities of the defendant within the forum."
In Penney, there is an additional factor that should further strengthen the
court's decision. There was a provision in the sales contract between the manu-
facturer and Penney whereby the manufacturer agreed to save Penney harmless
from all claims, including damages, attorneys' fees and costs arising out of any
defects in merchandise delivered pursuant to the accompanying order. This could be
construed as an agreement to abide by the substantive law of the state where the
suits were to be sold by Penney and to be amenable to jurisdiction there.33
If the Supreme Court wishes to avoid the conflict in decisions that must
naturally result from the rather broad standards laid down in International Shoe,
McGee and Hanson, it would seem wise to approve the above three-rule test,
with the suggested amendments. The present broad standard, with its attendant
nuances, fails to establish a rule by which fact situations may be properly judged.
If any real division in jurisdiction among state courts is to remain, it is necessary
that a more distinct enunciation of the criteria for assuming jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation be laid down by the Supreme Court.
George P. McAndrews
CONTRACTS - ILLUSORY CONTRACTS - RESERVATION BY ONE PARTY OF
RIGHT TO CHANGE COMPENSATION HELD NOT ADEQUATE FOR DECLARING CON-
TRACT UNENFORCEABLE. - In 1958, the plaintiff, Automatic Vending Company,
entered into a written contract with Miss Wisdom which entitled the plaintiff to
a three-year exclusive concession for the vending-machine sale of cigarettes in
defendant's cafe. Defendant's rate of compensation was explicit in the agreement,
but plaintiff reserved the right to modify it upon written notice. In 1959, Miss
Wisdom repudiated the contract. After Automatic Vending Company had suc-
cessfully brought an action in the Yolo County Superior Court, for damages arising
out of breach of contract, Miss Wisdom appealed, contending that the contract
was illusory and void since the plaintiff could at its discretion change the rates;
held: Affirmed. The contract was not illusory; the reservation of the discretionary
power to alter the rates imposed upon the plaintiff the duty of exercising that pre-
rogative in good faith and in accordance with fair dealing. Automatic Vending
Company v. Wisdom, 182 Cal. App. 2d 406, 6 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1960).
The general rules as to the validity of contracts in which one party reserves
31 249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959); accord, Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co.,
338 P.2d 596 (Cal. App. 1959), rev'd, 346 P.2d 409 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 927
(1960).
32 Contra, Arundel Crane Service, Inc. v. Thew Shovel Co., 214 Md. 387, 135 A.2d
428 (1957).
33 See Compania De Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357,
Dissenting opinion, 108 A.2d 372 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955). Other con-
siderations entered into the decision.
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an unlimited right to determine or change the rate or amount of consideration
differ, depending upon whether the contract has been executed by one of the
parties or is wholly executory.'
Executed contracts of this type are ordinarily enforced, the feeling being that
the court should determine a reasonable compensation.2 However, such was not
always the case. In an early English decision, the court held that an employer who
had retained the power to determine compensation had an unconditional right to
refuse payment, even though the employee had performed his part of the bargain. s
As the courts realized the injustice and inequity of this case, they began to give
the parties their due by allowing recovery on a quantum meruit theory.4 Later,
recovery was sanctioned in an action on the contract in cases where one of the
parties desired to repudiate the contract,5 or where the party with the power to
determine the price did so with bad faith or fraudulently. 6
The various rules that developed in this area indicate that the courts were
struggling for just ends without any sound criteria for decision. It was evident
that the person who had transferred the goods or rendered the services should be
reasonably compensated," but the courts did not wish to discriminate against the
person who had the prerogative to determine the amount 8 To solve this dilemma
the courts turned to a consideration of the mutual intentions of the parties at the
time of agreement,9 and the surrounding circumstances, ° in addition to relying on
the words of the contract. With few exceptions," this has resulted in the applica-
tion of the general rule that executed contracts are enforced with the court de-
termining a reasonable compensation.'
2
A contrary rule has evolved to cover actions based on contracts that are wholly
executory, that is, actions to recover expectant profits, commissions, etc., for serv-
ices not yet performed. In these cases, if one of the parties reserves to himself an
unlimited right to determine or change the compensation, the contract is illusory
and void.'
3
An early application of the rule is found in Foster v. Lumbermen's Min. Co.,'4
where the defendant's compensation for his iron ore depended upon the price at
which the plaintiff could sell it. The Supreme Court of Michigan excused the
defendant from his breach, holding the contract illusory and void since the plaintiff
1 12 AM. JUR. Contracts §71 (1938).
2 Eno v. Prime Mfg. Co., 314 Mass. 686, 50 N.E.2d 401 (1943); Corthell v. Summit
Thread Co., 132 Me. 94, 167 Atl. 79 (1933).
3 Taylor v. Brewer, 1 Maule & Sel. 290, 105 Eng. Rep. 108 (1813).
4 Bryant v. Flight, 5 Mees & W. 114, 151 Eng. Rep. 49 (1839).
5 F. R. Stocker Realty Co. v. Porter, 149 Minn. 185, 182 N.W. 993 (1921); Noble v.
Joseph Burnett Co., 208 Mass. 75, 94 N.E. 289 (1911). An exception to this rule existed
where a base rate or price was stated in the contract and one party reserved the right to
determine the amount of additional compensation. Von Reitzenstein v. Tomlinson, 249 N.Y.
60, 162 N.E. 584 (1928); Varney v. Ditmars, 217 N.Y. 223, 111 N.E. 822 (1916); Clark v.
Pearson, 53 Ill. App. 310 (1893).
6 Foster v. Young, 172 Cal. 317, 156 Pac. 476 (1916) (client with power to set lawyer's
fee determined it in bad faith). Along with this the rule developed that if the party with the
power to determine the compensation does so in good faith, the other party cannot recover
anything additional, even if the amount determined is unreasonable. Callum v. Ford Motor
Co., 107 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1940); Butler v. Winona Mill Co., 28 Minn. 205, 9 N.W. 697
(1881).
7 North American Car Corp. v. Green, 175 Okla. 136, 52 P.2d 798 (1935).
8 Lee's Appeal, 53 Conn. 363, 2 At. 758 (1886).
9 Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Ross, 155 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1946); Krosnowski v. Kros-
nowski, 22 N.J. 376, 126 A.2d 182 (1956); Bellsfield v. Holcombe, 102 N.J. Eq. 20, 139
Ad. 817 (1927).
10 Casriel v. King, 2 N.J. 45, 65 A.2d 514 (1949).
11 e.g., Chiapparelli v. Baker, Kellogg and Co., 252 N.Y. 192, 169 N.E. 274 (1929).
12 See cases cited noted 2, supra.
13 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 98 (1950).
14 68 Mich. 188, 36 N.W. 171 (1888); accord, Schreiner v. Shanahan, 105 Neb. 525,
181 N.W. 536 (1921).
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had the ability to control the price of the ore. Similar decisions have been handed
down in other jurisdictions. Contracts where a school board promised to pay a
teacher "good wages," 15 where a salesman desiring to extend his territory had to
pay a unilaterally determined fee to the manufacturer, 8 where the price of air-
planes was to be a list price which varied at the will of the manufacturer and
where the price of school furniture was to be determined by the manufacturer, 5
have been declared unenforceable.
Though these cases still represent the majority view, several exceptions have
arisen in recent years; the present case is an example. In holding this agreement
enforceable, the Automatic Vending court relied heavily on the reasoning of Cali-
fornia Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Company, 9 where a contract for the sale
of sugar beets was held enforceable, even though the defendant had the power
to set the ultimate price to be paid to the plaintiff. In that case the court opened
its argument by stating the general rule that courts will not make contracts for the
parties.2 0 It then referred to the California interpretation of this principle as stated
in McIllmoil v. Frawley Motor Co.:
The law does not favor, but leans against, the destruction of contracts
because of uncertainty; and it will, if feasible, so construe agreements as
to carry into effect the reasonable intentions of the parties if that can be
ascertained.
2'
Next, section 1729 of the California Civil Code2 was cited, which, along with the
Mclllmoil rule, has been relied upon by the courts for preserving agreements in
which price has been left uncertain.
2 3
The California Lettuce court concluded its argument for enforcement of the
contract by discussing the legal limitations imposed on a party possessing discre-
tionary rights. One of the leading cases is Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press
Mfg. Co., in which it was stated:
In every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do
anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of
the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in
every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.2 4
15 Fairplay School Township v. O'Neal, 127 Ind. 95, 26 N.E. 686 (1891).
16 Raisler Sprinkler Co. v. Automatic Sprinkler Co., 36 Del. 57, 171 Atl. 214 (1934).
17 Nebraska Aircraft Corp. v. Varney, 282 Fed. 608 (8th Cir. 1922).
18 Lipman v. Arlington Seating Co., 192 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1951).
19 45 Cal. 2d 474, 289 P.2d 785 (1955).
20 Id. at 790: "Unless the court has ascertainable provisions of agreement before it,
there is no contract on which the court may act."
21 190 Cal. 546, 213 Pac. 971, 972 (1923). The McIllmoil rule was derived from
Sutliff v. Seidenberg, Steifel & Co., 132 Cal. 63, 64 Pac. 131 (1901), and summarized that
court's interpretation of §§ 1643, 1647, and 1649 of the CAL. Civ. CODm It has been cited
consistently by the California courts. See, e.g., Bettancourt v. Gilroy Theatre Co., 120 Cal.
App. 2d 364, 261 P.2d 351 (1953); Haggerty v. Warner, 115 Cal. App. 2d 468, 252 P.2d
373 (1953); Avalon Products, Inc. v. Lentini, 98 Cal. App. 2d 177, 219 P.2d 485 (1950).
22 CAL. CeV. CODE § 1729:
Definition and ascertainment of price. (1) The price may be fixed by the
contract, or may be left to be fixed in such manner as may be agreed, or
it may be determined by the course of dealing between the parties ...
(4) Where the price is not determined in accordance with the foregoing
provisions the buyer must pay a reasonable price. What is a reasonable
price is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each par-
ticular case.
23 Patterson-Ballagh Corp. v. Byron Jackson Co., 145 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1944); Great
Western Distillery Products, Inc. v. John A. Wathen Distillery Co., 10 Cal. 2d 442, 74
P.2d 745 (1937).
24 20 Cal. 2d 751, 128 P.2d 665, 677 (1942), contract held valid where plaintiff was
to receive a share of profits from sale of machinery. The Universal Sales rule was taken
from 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 328 (1939). Later, the Supreme Court of California in Nelson
v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 177 P.2d 931 (1947), stated the same rule but derived it from
two New York cases, Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 77, 188 N.E.
163 (1933), and Underhill v. Schenck, 238 N.Y. 7, 143 N.E. 773 (1924). Since the Nelson
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The court extended the Universal Sales rule, which pertained to an already valid
contract, by stating that the "implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing"
could be used to validate a contract which was otherwise too indefinite for enforce-
ment.
In following the California Lettuce Growers case, by implying a limitation
on discretion and enforcing the contract, Automatic Vending Company represents
a continuation of California's frontal attack on the majority rule.
A second method of avoiding the strictness of the majority rule is manifested
in Mantell v. International Plastic Harmonicas Corp.,25 where the court upheld a
contract in which a manufacturer told his only distributor that he would sell to
him at a price no higher than the price to other distributors. The court recognized
the majority rule, but distinguished this case from it.
Unlike a pure contract of purchase and sale, agreements of this class
[i.e., distributorship contracts] embody mutual promises and obligations
with sufficiently definite standards by which performance can be tested.
The grant of the exclusive franchise is a consideration for the grantee's
obligation to establish and develop a market for the sale and distribution
of the product in the area covered by the monopoly. The character of
the contractual arrangement is such as to preclude explicitness as to quantity
and prices.
26
Having thus established the validity of the contract, the Mantell court then applied
a New Jersey statute27 which asserts that, in a contract mute as to price, a reason-
able price can be implied.
Principles similar to those adopted in the Mantell case have been applied in
other decisions, where, due to the exigencies of the particular situation, the parties
were deliberately silent as to compensation or other material contract terms, with
one party having the right to determine them at a future time.2
A third possible escape from the majority rule is an abrogation of it by statute.
Assuming such a goal is desirable, this undoubtedly would be the most efficacious
procedure since the majority rule is deeply embedded in the common law.
Until recently, section 9 of the Uniform Sales Act29 was the only applicable
statute, and even it does not apply to agreements in which one party has a uni-
lateral power to determine price. It was mentioned in both California Lettuce
Growers and Mantell; but in both instances the courts relied on other principles
to validate the contract.2 0 The Sales Act was used only as an aid in determining
price after the contract had been deemed valid.
The Uniform Commercial Code deals directly with this problem: "A price
to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for him to fix in good
faith.""' Though this section has not been construed in any of the jurisdictions
case, courts applying the principle have been citing both that case and Universal Sales Corp.;
e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878 (1949); Harm v. Frasher,
181 Cal. App. 2d 461, 5 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1960); Bergum v. Weber, 136 Cal. App. 2d 389,
288 P.2d 623 (1955).
25 141 N.J. Eq. 379, 55 A.2d 250 (1947).
26 Id. at 256.
27 N. J. REv. STAT. § 46:30-15 (1937), identical to California statute supra note 22,
and UNIFORM SALES ACT § 9.
28 Bendix Home Appliances, Inc. v. Radio Accessories Co., 129 F.2d 177 (8th Cir.
1942); Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1940); Ken-Rad Corp. v. Bohan-
nan, 80 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1935); Moon Motor Car Co. of New York v. Moon Motor Car
Co., Inc., 29 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1928); Fox v. Stuyvesant Town, Inc., 3 N.J. Super., 408, 66
A.2d 47 (1949), modified, 5 N.J. Super. 253, 68 A.2d 776 (1949).
29 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 9, set out supra note 22.
30 In the California Lettuce Growers case, the court relied on McIllmoil v. Frawley
Motor Co., 190 Cal. 546, 213 Pac. 971 (1923), and Universal Sales Corp. v. California
Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 128 P.2d 665 (1942). In MantelU, the court distinguished
the facts from those of an ordinary executory contract to buy and sell goods.
31 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODF §2-305(2).
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where the Code prevails,32 there is a strong feeling that it will supplant the com-
mon law.33
These exceptions to the majority rule are indicative of the future status of
the law and express a rule analogous to that which now prevails in the case of
executed contracts. Equity demanded the implication of a reasonable price to
enforce a contract which had been partially or wholly executed by one of the parties,
and so the majority rule of enforcement of these contracts developed at an early
date. The equity argument was not as strong, however, in the case of wholly execu-
tory agreements, with the main argument for enforcement being one of social
policy, namely, that a person should be bound by his promises. The result was
the development of the majority rule that wholly executory agreements in which
one party had the power to determine compensation were illusory and void. Cali-
fornia Lettuce Growers, Mantell, and the Uniform Commercial Code represent a
rejection of this and a recognition that the controlling factors in all contracts should
be the implied as well as the expressed intentions of the parties at the time they
make the agreement. This is a realistic approach, and one that should be adopted,
because the purpose of the courts is not to hinder the making of contracts, but to
facilitate their construction and interpretation and in so doing to protect the bar-
gained-for rights of the parties.
Edward J. Fillenwarth, Jr.
CONTRACTS - INFANTS - ADULT MAY ENFORCE CONTRACT AGAINST INFANT
WHO INDUCED AGREEMENT BY FRAUDULENTLY MISREPRESENTING His AGE.- In
December 1952, Merrick, an emancipated minor, entered into a contract to pur-
chase a house through Stephens, a real estate broker, by fraudulently representing
that he was of age. In accordance with the agreement, Merrick made a down pay-
ment and executed a mortgage note to Stephens. Merrick lived in the house with
his wife until June, 1953, when he moved out and entered into a rental agency
agreement with Stephens. During this period, Stephens applied a portion of the
monthly rent to the mortgage and remitted the balance to Merrick, who refused
to accept the remittance and filed written disaffirmance of the contract in June,
1954.'
Although the remainder of the facts were not made clear to the appellate
court, it appears that Merrick instituted proceedings against Stephens and the
former owners of the house to recover his down payment. He won a default judg-
ment, which was paid by an execution sale of the property. Merrick then brought
this action to recover payments made to Stephens during the period he lived in
the house. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that Merrick had misrepresented
his age, that he had fraudulently conspired to put himself in a position where he
could not make restitution, asking that the mortgage be foreclosed, -that the property
be sold and that the balance of the mortgage debt be paid by a general levy on
the plaintiff. This lower court entered judgment for the defendant. The Court
of Appeals held: Affirmed. Where an infant has induced a contract by fraudulently
representing himself to be of age, he is estopped from rescinding the contract on
32 § 2-305 of the Uniform Commercial Code has been enacted in six states: CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-305 (1960) (effective 10-1-61); Ky. REv. STAT. § 77.2-305 (1959)
(effective 7-1-60); MAss. ANN LAWS ch. 106, § 2-305 (Supp. 1958) (effective 10-1-58);
N.H. Rzv. STAT. ANN. (to be included in ch. 283a of future edition); (effective 7-1-61);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §2-305 (1954) (effective 7-1-54); R.I. GEN. LAwS ANN. § 6A-2-305
(1960) (effective 1-2-62).
33 1 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS 98 n.49 (1950).
1 Mo. REv. STAT. § 442.080 (1949). Missouri has enacted a statute in reference to
conveyances of title by minors roughly following the common law, stipulating that the minor
must disaffirm within two years after the legal disability is removed if he is to take advantage
of his infancy.
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the grounds of infancy, and the defendant is entitled to recover on the contract
price the amount of debt and damages sustained. Merrick v. Stephens, 337 S.W. 2d
713 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
The problem of how to deal with an infant who has fraudulently induced an
adult to contract with him by misrepresenting his age has led to a variety of judicial
approaches. Two conflicting policy questions are raised: (1) How may the courts
hold inviolate the general right of an infant to be protected against his own improvi-
dence and the craft of unscrupulous adults? (2) How can a court equitably resolve
situations where an adult has been duped by a knowledgeable minor who has used
his infancy as a means of exploitation? 2 Merrick is significant in that it illustrates
the basic exceptions to the infant's general right of avoidance and a clear trend to
hold mature minors liable for contractual obligations induced by their misrepresen-
tations.
The settled law is that infant contracts are not void, but voidable.3 It appears
that this right of avoidance has been granted to minors for a two-fold purpose:
(1) to protect the infant from his own mistakes, and (2) to give him protection
from unscrupulous adults.4
Historically, the first exception to the infant's general right of avoidance
occurred where the contract was one for necessities. 5 In order for an emancipated
minor to be able to provide for himself, it is essential that he be able to bind him-
self in a contract6 for those things necessary to sustain life.
7
Another exception to the infant's right to disaffirm obtains in the situation
where the infant has misrepresented his age. However, most jurisdictions still fol-
low the general rule and allow the minor to disaffirm.8 A growing minority of
states, recognizing the basic injustice of this result, have treated the problem dif-
ferently and have extended the infant's liability in one of two ways: (1) allowing
a tort action for fraud, or (2) applying the doctrine of estoppel.
Those states allowing the adult to recover in a tort action for deceit 9 have
drawn the distinction between fraud ex-contractu and fraud ex-delicto ;"0 they argue
that the infant is liable for his torts, that fraudulent representation of age is an
actionable tort and that recovery should be based on the tort rather than on the
contract.
On the other hand, some states have held that the misrepresentation estops
the infant from pleading infancy as a defense. Courts of equity have usually in-
voked the clean hands rule, estopping the infant from rescinding the contract. 1
In courts of law, few states have used estoppel; 1 2 but, as evidenced in Merrick, with
the merger of law and equity, the number has grown.
2 See generally Miller, Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Age as Affecting an Infant's
Contract, 15 U. PITT. L. Rzv. 73 (1953).
3 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 226 (rev. ed. 1936).
4 See Miller, supra note 2, at 75.
5 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 223.
6 Id. § 240. Although this liability of the infant is referred to as "for his contracts,"
the statement i$ not altogether accurate. The amount of the liability is not based on the
contract price, but seems to be quasi-contractual, based on the reasonable value of the
services rendered.
7 Williams v. Buckler, 264 S.W.2d 279 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954). In Ballinger v. Craig,
95 Ohio App. 545, 121 N.E.2d 66 (1953), the court gave a working definition of necessaries,
taken from the Ohio statute (at 67):
In determining whether a given article is a necessary, two factors are in-
volved, first, is the article suitable to the condition in life of the infant,
and second, is the article actually required at the time of delivery?
8 1 Williston, op. cit. supra note 3, § 245.
9 See generally Miller, op. cit. supra note 2.
10 E.g., Byers v. Lemai Bank & Trust Co., 365 Mo. 341, 282 S.W.2d 512 (1956).
11 1 Williston, op. cit. supra note 3, § 245.
12 Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U.S. 18 (1927); Tuck v. Payne, 159 Tenn. 192,
17 S.W.2d 8 (1929). In La Rosa v. Nichols, 92 N.J.L. 375, 105 At. 201 (1918), the court
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In Merrick, the court combines a number of the elements inherent in the
above-mentioned exceptions:
All we decide in this case is that based on the peculiar facts before us,
which involve a combination of age of discretion, apparent maturity,
deceit, estoppel, lack of restitution, emancipation and necessity the plaintiff
should be held to his contract and the judgment should be affirmed.' 3
The court indicated that it was favorably disposed to use estoppel to deny
Merrick's claim for the payments and to enforce foreclosure of the mortgage,14 but
because of Missouri precedent, it was unwilling to rely on estoppel alone. The'
court construed the contract to purchase the home as being for a necessity, relying
on Merrick's personal status, in which emancipation was a major factor. The rule
regarding emancipation is that, of itself, it does not operate to make the infant
sui juris, 5 but so affects his position in life as to create "an enlarged and more
extended necessity." '6
The law in Missouri follows the general rule allowing the infant to bind him-
. self in a contract for necessities, 7 but the particular question of whether a house
is a necessity had not been adjudicated prior to Merrick. In classifying a house as
one of the goods for which an infant may contract, the court relied on several
decisions from other states.' 8 Although these decisions represent a minority posi-
tion,'9 in view of the circumstances of this case and the nature of necessities, this
extension is not surprising.
The court's unwillingness to rely on what it terms a "pure estoppel" 2 0 is
based on past decisions by the Missouri courts on this question. In the early case
of Ryan v. Growney,21 the equity court recognized estoppel as denying the infant's
the right to disaffirm where he had misrepresented his age. Typically, the court
invoked the clean hands doctrine.
Later Missouri law courts failed to grant estoppel, 22 and in 1925, the Missouri
Court of Appeals summed up the prevailing attitude toward estoppel in Gerkey
v. Hampe:
By the greater weight of authority, in actions ex-contractu, an infant is not
estopped by representations made during infancy. . . . While we do not
wish to go so far as to say that a minor may never estop himself, yet, if
estoppel ever becomes effective, the evidence supporting it must be certain,
clear and unequivocal.
23
Prior to Merrick, the Missouri Supreme Court considered a similar case in
Byers v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co. 24 This case concerned an infant who had mis-
represented his age in order to obtain several loans with the defendant bank. The
misrepresentations had taken place previous to the loan transactions, however, and
the court drew a distinction between liability ex-contractu and liability ex-delicto,
maintaining that any affirmative relief for the adult lay in a tort action for damages
proximately resulting from the fraud. The court did refuse to grant the infant
said (at 202): "Mhe doctrine of equitable estoppel, although the creature of equity and
depending upon equitable principles, is recognized and enforced alike by courts of law and
equity."
13 Merrick v. Stephens, 337 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
14 Id. at 719.
15 3 PAGE, CONTRACTS § 1572 (2d ed. 1920).
16 Merrick v. Stephens, 337 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
17 O'Donniley v. Kinley, 220 Mo. App. 284, 286 S.W. 140 (1926).
18 Lindsey v. Hubbard, 74 S.D. 114, 49 N.W.2d 299 (1951); Ragan v. Williams, 220
Ala. 590, 127 So. 190 (1930); Johnson v. Newberry, 267 S.W. 476 (Tex. Com. App. 1924).
19 1 Williston, op. cit. supra note 3, § 242.
20 Merrick v. Stephens, 337 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. Ct, App. 1960).
21 125 Mo. 474, 28 S.W. 189 (1894).
22 Ridgeway v. Herbert, 150 Mo. 606, 51 S.W. 1040 (1899); Miller v. St. Louis &
S.F.R Co., 188 Mo. App. 402, 174 S.W. 166 (1915).
23 274 S.W. 510, 514 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925).
24 365 Mo. 341, 282 S.W.2d 512 (1956).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
rescission, however, citing the equitable nature of the action and invoking the
clean hands doctrine.
In the holding in Merrick, the court enumerates several of the elements of
estoppel2 5 present in the case.26 Apparent maturity is one of the elements necessary
to justify reasonable reliance on the part of the adult merchant. In the early case
of Ridgeway v. Herbert,27 the court refused to implement estoppel, implying that
the infant's appearance and other factual circumstances negated bona fide reliance
on the misrepresentation.
Lack of restitution has generally not been a bar to rescission on the part of the
infant unless the consideration is still held and the infant refuses to tender it back.
In Missouri, however, there is a split on the rule. The court in Merrick relies on
the early case of Bell v. Kerr,28 which held that, where the benefits were of such a
nature as to prevent restoration to the status quo, there could be no rescission. The
Merrick opinion combines this with the clean hands doctrine, stating that it would
be against good conscience if the minor were "permitted to claim invalidity and at
the same time join in acts which would prevent restoration." 29 In short, there
was a hint of collusion, and the court refused to become party to it.
Age of discretion and deceit, the last two elements of the situation cited in
Merrick, are general currents indicative of the court's attitude toward final dispo-
sition of the controversy. The implication of age of discretion, as discussed by the
court, is that the reasons for protecting the infant do not prevail where the infant
has reached an age at which he can choose wisely and is sophisticated enough to
be not unduly vulnerable to exploitation.
The conclusion that "the plaintiff should be held to his contract," if divorced
from the rest of the case, does not convey a true picture of what is happening here.
The court indicates that the general rule as applied to necessity contracts is that
the infant is liable for only the reasonable value of the service rendered. It sub-
scribes to this rule, but places on the infant the burden of proving that he has
been unfairly dealt with. In the event he is unable to do this, the court said, the
contract price will be enforced as a fair and reasonable price.
What the court has done in Merrick, then, is to recognize estoppel and employ
it within limits. Theoretically, estoppel could have been utilized to grant affirma-
tive relief on Stephens' counter-claim, 0 but because of a reluctance to go against
the Lemay dictum, and circumstances permitting a more "acceptable" means of
granting relief, the court did not go that far.
In order to charge an infant on estoppel grounds, all of the elements of an
estoppel must be present. Therefore, it does not seem an unwarranted extension
of the exception regarding misrepresentations. To categorically deny estoppel is
to grant the infant a tool for escaping his just debts. The rules as to avoidance
stand in danger of growing rigid if they do not keep pace with society.
To grant relief in tort for the fraud is an acceptable alternative; but this
resolution concentrates on damages rather than on the contract-it is a remedy,
but not a cure for the general problem. The decision in Merrick, in recognizing
the elements of estoppel and weaving them in with a more "acceptable" means of
solution, has looked to the future and shown a cognizance of the broader implica-
tions of the problem; it is in keeping with the current trend of increasing the infant's
responsibility.
Dennis R. Powell
25 See 15 (rI.-KENT L. REv. 146 (1936) for the elements of an estoppel.
26 Merrick v. Stephens, 337 S.W.2d 713, 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
27 150 Mo. 606, 51 S.W. 1040 (1899).
28 44 Mo. 120 (1869); contra, Ridgeway v. Herbert, 150 Mo. 606, 51 S.W. 1040 (1899).
29 Merrick v. Stephens, 337 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
30 Gerkey v. Hampe, 274 S.W. 510 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925).
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CRmINAL LAW - WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT - SINGLE ACT OF INTERCOURSE
NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE VIOLATION OF THE MANN ACT.- Upon an in-
dictment charging the violation of the Mann Act,' McClung moved that the indict-
ment be dismissed on the ground that the acts alleged were not prohibited by the
statute. The defendant transported two sisters from their home in West Virginia
to his residence in Louisiana for the purpose of having sexual relations with them.
There was no purport of fraud or force in transporting them, nor was there any
mention of previous depravity of the sisters. The indictment related only a single
act of intercourse with each sister. The District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana held: The facts alleged were insufficient to charge violation of the statute
because the immoral act occurred but once. United States V. McClung, 187 F.
Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1960).
The Mann Act, officially entitled the White Slave Traffic Act, historically is
one of the most important federal criminal statutes. For the first 30 years of its
existence, it was the second most prosecuted federal criminal offense. 2 Its roots
are to be found in the Immigration Act of 1907, which prohibited importation of
women to be used as prostitutes.8 A year later the Senate adopted the treaty of
1905, banning international traffic in women.4 To supplement the international
treaty, Congress took steps to enact a similar law making interstate traffic in women
criminal. This was followed in 1910 with the Mann Act,5 despite opposition in
both committee and full Congress over the act's purported interference with the
police powers of the states. The opponents of the bill contended that punishing
immorality was not a constitutionally granted power;8 proponents of the bill pointed
out that the purpose was not to regulate morality, but to close interstate commerce
to the "nefarious white slave traffic." 
7
The statute posited three requirements for its violation: interstate transportation
1 White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-24 (1958). § 2421:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, or in the
District of Columbia or in any territory or Possession of the United States,
any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution, or debauchery, or for
any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice,
or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute, or to give herself up
to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice; . . . shall be
fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
2 The ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORTS for the years 1910 through 1940
indicate total numbers of prosecutions for the 30-year period set prosecutions for violation
of Mann Act second only to violations of the Dyer Act (interstate transportation of stolen
automobiles).
3 An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens Into the United States § 3, 34 Stat.
899 (1907).
4 International Agreement for the Repression of the Trade in White Women, July 25,
1902, 35 Stat. 1979, T. S. No. 496 (effective June 15, 1908).
5 White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-24 (1958).
6 "If Congress has the power to do what this bill proposes, then the door is open wide
to the assumption by the National Government of an almost unlimited body of legislation
which has heretofore been recognized as particularly within the jurisdiction of the States."
H.R. REP. No. 47, part 2, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 29-32 (1910). But see Hoke v. United States,
227 U.S. 308 (1913) (constitutionality of act upheld over this objection).
7 H.R. Rep. No. 47, part 1, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1910), provides:
The legislation is not needed or intended as an aid to the States in the
exercise of their police powers in the suppression or regulation of immor-
ality in general. It does not attempt to regulate the practice of voluntary
prostitution, but aims solely to prevent panderers and procurers from
compelling thousands of women and girls against their wills and desires
to enter and continue a life of prostitution. . . . These investigations have
disclosed the further fact that these women are practically slaves in the
true sense of the word; that many of them are kept in houses of ill fame
against their will; and that force, if necessary, is used to deprive them of
their liberty.
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of women," with intent to achieve an immoral purpose,9 the intent being formed
before reaching the state where the immoral acts were to be performed.1 In apply-
ing the statute, the second requirement is the only one which has given the courts
difficulty. The immoral intent must be for purposes of prostitution, debauchery, or
other immoral purposes." The interpretation has been relatively simple in regard
to prostitution and debauchery. "Prostitution" has been retained relatively intact
in its common law definition. 2 For criminal purposes, "debauchery" has been
defined as that situation which "eventually and naturally leads to a course of
immorality sexually." 3 Convictions have thus been obtained in cases where
women were transported to manage houses of prostitution,-4 take part in nude
dances,1 and entice men to enter houses of prostitution.'16 "Other immoral pur-
poses" has been the battleground for different interpretations of the statute.
The present case raises the question of just what these "other immoral pur-
poses" are. The title of the statute indicates Congress thought of "immoral pur-
poses" as grounded in the idea of prostitution. The first deviation from this inter-
pretation came in Athanasaw v. United States,'7 where the statute was interpreted
to include the transportation of women to work in surroundings that might lead
them to prostitution. The departure was made radical in Caminetti v. United
States.'8 The defendant was found guilty under the statute of transporting a
woman across state lines to establish her as his mistress. The Court held that private
immorality was included in the act through the plain import of the words "immoral
purposes." The court viewed the application of the statute as follows: "The
prostitute may, in the popular sense, be more degraded in character than the con-
cubine, but the latter none the less must be held to lead an immoral life." ' 9 This
interpretation of the statute to include non-commercial vice was taken up again in
Cleveland v. United States.20 Over a vigorous dissent, 2" the court held that poly-
gamous marriage was an immoral purpose prohibited by the act, saying, "Whether
an act is immoral within the meaning of the statute is not to be determined by
the accused's concept of morality. Congress has provided the standard."22
Judge Wright distinguished McClung from those landmark cases by calling
attention to the fact that those cases dealt with an immoral relationship of some
duration.2 3 In neither Caminetti nor Cleveland did the Supreme Court state what
8 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); United States v. Jamerson, 60 F. Supp.
281 (N.D. Iowa 1944).
9 Hunter v. United States, 45 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1930); Fisher v. United States, 266
Fed. 667 (4th Cir. 1920); Johnson v. United States, 215 Fed. 679 (7th Cir. 1914).
10 Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944); Drossos v. United States, 16 F.2d
833 (8th Cir. 1927); Corbett v. United States, 229 Fed. 27 (9th Cir. 1924).
11 White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1958).
12 "Prostitution, in its legal sense, is the practice of a woman or girl in submitting to
indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men for pay, as distinguished from illicit sexual inter-
course with one man." 2 BuRDIcx, LAW OF CRIME § 370 (1946).
13 Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U.S. 326, 331 (1913).
14 Simpson v. United States, 245 Fed. 278 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 667
(1917).
15 United States v. Lewis, 110 F.2d 460 (10th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 634
(1947).
16 Beyer v. United States, 251 Fed. 15 (9th Cir. 1918).
17 227 U.S. 326 (1913).
18 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
19 Id. at 487. The court added: "Where the language is plain and admits of no more
than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid
doubtful meanings need no discussion. There is no ambiguity in the terms of this act." Id.
at 485.
20 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
21 Id. at 24. Mr. Justice Murphy wrote: "The consequence of prolonging the Caminetti
decision is to make the federal courts arbiters of the morality of those who cross state lines
in the company of women or girls." Id. at 29.
22 Id. at 20.
23 United States v. McClung, 187 F. Supp. 254, 257 (E.D. La. 1960).
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the decision would have been if the illicit intent had been directed toward one
solitary act of immorality. In the present case there is no intimation that a con-
tinuing relationship is being established; on the contrary, a single act of intercourse
is charged in the indictment.
The distinction Judge Wright makes in the present case has not been made
in other circuits. Recent cases have extended the Caminetti doctrine to include
transportation for the purpose of one immoral act.2 4 Brown v. United States held:
"The language of ... [the] Mann Act, in our opinion, covers the interstate trans-
portation of a woman with intent to have illicit relations with her by force or other-
wise." 25 But there has been at least one recent case where the application of the
statute to a "weekend devoted to recreation" was thought to be unenforceable.2
Judge Wright points out two other reasons for his decision: the vagaries of
the words "immoral purposes," and the legislative intent in framing the bill.
27
While no case dealing with the application of this statute has called the vagueness
of the term into question, support can be found in a Louisiana case where a juvenile
delinquency statute was ruled unconstitutional on the grounds that the word
"immoral" was too vague to have any real meaning.28 It was noted earlier that
Congress had no thought of the statute's application to private immoralities. By
a strict use of the ejusdem generis rule, the McClung case would not fall under
the statute. But this argument was answered in the Caminetti case under the
doctrine of "plain import."
Another buttress to the justice of the present decision is the fact that the
immoral act in this case was fornication. This was not a crime at common law.29
The majority of American states have not seen fit to make fornication a crime unless
done publicly.2 0
Practically, the decision could well mark a restriction on the application of
the Mann Act to private immorality. The Caminetti decision has been subject to
much criticism, most of it arguing that the holding was contrary to the legislative
intent.3 ' The court in the present case follows Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning
that it is the legislature, not the court, which should define a crime and ordain its
punishment.3 2 From a perusal of the cases where an indictment has been brought
for private immorality, it is readily apparent that most prosecuting attorneys do
not bring an action unless there are aggravating circumstances in addition to the
immorality.33 This may be the result of the widespread theory that all sex laws
are more or less unenforceable; it has been estimated that less than one per cent
of the actual number of sex-law violators are ever brought into court.3 4 The laws
24 United States v. Marks, 274 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1959); Brown v. United States, 237
F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1956).
25 237 F.2d 281, 283 (8th Cir. 1956).
26 United States v. Ross, 257 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958). This case is distinguishable
from McClung by the application of the dominant motive rule in not splitting up the round
trip into two one-way ventures.
27 United States v. McClung, 187 F. Supp. 254, 257 (E.D. La. 1960).
28 State v. Vallery 212 La. 1095, 34 So. 2d 329 (1948).
29 CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES § 11.04 (6th ed. 1958).
30 Bensing, A Comparative Study of American Sex Statutes, 42 J. CRiM. L., C. & P.S. 57,
70-72 (1951).
31 Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal
Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2, 7-8 (1940).
32 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820).
33 See, e.g., United States v. Marks, 274 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1959) (transported minor
girl with intent to place in house of prostitution); Simon v. United States, 145 F.2d 345
(4th Cir. 1944) (cohabitation leaving six children motherless); Haskett v. United States,
145 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1944) (transported 14-year-old stepdaughter).
34 KINSEY, POMEROY, MARTIN & GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE
18 (1953).
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pertaining to the sexual actions of man have done little to restrain him.35 Current
information led Kinsey to remark, "The current sex laws are unenforced and
unenforceable because they are too completely out of accord with the realities of
human behavior."3 6 To substantiate that remark, his book estimates that some-
thing like 50 per cent of American women have had intercourse before marriage,
while the figure for men is even higher37
This belief in the uselessness of statutes governing private sex offenses induced
some states to drop prosecutions for many of their non-public sex laws.3 8 While
the states are acting in accord with the changing attitudes of their citizens, it would
be foolish, indeed an attempt at the impossible, for the federal government to punish
for breaches of these same outmoded laws. The present decision takes the more
sane approach to the matter, one which would release the federal judicial machinery
to more pressing concerns. As one judge wrote in a decision concerning the Mann
Act, "If such is the law (applying the statute to private immorality) then the Mann
Act is merely a means of trapping a few non-commercial minnows, while the sharks
of commercial vice carry on their predatory work with impunity and immunity. '
Charles Griffin
ESCHEAT - CONFLICT OF LAWS - ESCHEAT OF INTANGIBLES OF FOREIGN
CORPOATION ALLOWED IN STATE OF INTANGIBLES CREATION.-- Western Union
Telegraph Company, a New York corporation doing business in Pennsylvania,
receives money in its offices in that state for transmission to other offices both
within and without the state for payment to persons designated by the sender.
Western Union is sometimes unable to make payment to the payee or repay-
ment to the sender. The payee may never be located, or he may be given a draft
which is never presented for payment. If the payee is not found, the sender may
prove impossible to locate or may fail to present a draft issued to him. The com-
pany's practice is to mix such unclaimed funds with its own and, after a period
of time, to destroy the records of the transactions.
In 1953 an escheator for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed a petition
in the Dauphin County Court for escheat of those monies held by Western Union
which had originally been received in offices in Pennsylvania and had remained
unclaimed for seven years. After notice to claimants by newspaper publication in
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Harrisburg, the court ordered that a judgment of
escheat be entered in favor of the Commonwealth.
Western Union appealed, claiming (1) that the petition of escheat did not
designate any property of the company within or subject to the control of the
state; (2) that a judgment of escheat did not satisfy due process of law and
35 "The natural desire for sinful pleasures often surpasses all religious mandates. Eccle-
siastical laws extolling chastity have restrained some individuals, but on the whole they have
failed miserably." DRZAZGA, SEx CRIMES 108 (1960).
36 KINSEY, POMEROY, MARTIN, & GEBHARD, Op. cit. supra note 34, at 20. In writing
of Kinsey's report, Reinhold Niebuhr states:
Tolerance for sex offenses which are not too flagrant has been achieved
because it is widely recognized that the vagrancy of sex passion is very
great, and that therefore peripheral misconduct, and occasional, rather than
habitual and perpetual defiance of the basic loyalties must be dealt with
without too much severity on the part of the offended party.
Niebuhr, Kinsey and the Moral Problem of Man's Sexual Life, from GEDDES, AN ANALYSIS
OF THE KINSEY REPORTS ON SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE AND FEMALE 68
(1954).
37 KINSEY, POMEROY, MARTIN & GEBHARD, op. cit. supra note 34, at 286.
38 Guttmacher & Weihofen, Sex Offenses, 43 J. CPim. L., C. & P.S. 153, 154 (1952);
Bensing, supra note 30, at 57.
39 United States v. Jamerson, 60 F. Supp. 281, 284 (N.D. Iowa 1944).
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would not protect it from claims by holders; (3) that the company would be
subject to claims by other states. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held:
Affirmed. Escheat may be had of obligations owed by a foreign corporation doing
business within the state to unknown persons both within and without the state.
Notice by publication solely within the state escheating is sufficient notice to
satisfy due process. Commonwealth v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 400 Pa.
343, 162 A.2d 617 (1960).
This case squarely presents the question of the power of states to escheat
unclaimed obligations. The difficulties in dealing with this problem arise from
three sources: First, the domicile of the obligee is unknown. Second, the obligors
are often, as in this case, corporations doing business in more than one state. Finally,
the items which escheat are intangibles whose situs, for purpose of escheat, must
be declared by the court, as it cannot be determined in fact.
Present day unclaimed property statutes are more an outgrowth of the com-
mon law concept of bona vacantia, by which all personal property reverted to
the crown upon the death of its owner without heirs, than of escheat.' More
than three-quarters of the states now have some sort of unclaimed personal proper-
ty legislation. 2 Comprehensive statutes reaching almost all types of personal proper-
ty, including intangibles, now exist in 17 states.8 The essential difference between
these statutes and more ordinary escheat provisions is that the former do not re-
quire proof of the death of the owner without heirs. Rather, they presume abandon-
ment after the running of the statutory period. Such statutes are of two general
types: custodial taking, whereby the state merely assumes the custody of abandoned
items and the owner has a right to reclaim the property; and escheat, whereby
title passes to the state.4 The differences between these two types can be important
for questions of notice, but have little real bearing on the practical effects of the
taking, or on the question of which state shall take unclaimed monies.5 Preceding
the general unclaimed property statutes, and sometimes co-existing with them,
are special statutes in many states referring to such intangibles as bank deposits,6
deposits made with public utilities,7 unclaimed corporation dividends s and pro-
ceeds of insurance policies.9
The question of the power of states to escheat unclaimed intangibles is usually
handled by an attempt to determine their location for purposes of escheat. Under
the common law maxim, mobilia sequantur personam (movables follow the per-
son), it was once generally thought that intangibles could be reached for pur-
poses of escheat only at the place of the owner's domicile.10 In most cases in-
1, McBride, Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat, and the Corporation Lawyer, 14 Bus. LAw.
1062 (1959).
2 Ibid.
3 ALASKA ComP. LAws ANN. § 57-8-8 (1949); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 54-351 (1956);
ARx. STAT. § 50-601 (1947); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1501 (Supp. 1960); CONN. GEN. STAT.
REv. § 3-56 (1958); Ky. REv. STAT. § 393.010 (Supp. 1960); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 200A,
§ 1-17 (1955); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1053 (1) (1953); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:37-11
(1952); N.Y.ABAN-. PROP. § 101-1052, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-20 (1952); ORE. Rmv. STAT.
§ 98.302 (Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 27, § 241-301 (1958); WASHx. REv. CODE
§ 63.28.010 (1955); WYO. STAT. § 9-687 (1957).
4 There are states having hybrids; see Ky. Rnv. STAT. § 393.010 (Supp. 1959). These
provide for escheat after a period of custodial holding. Under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 241-301
(1959), property escheats immediately but provision is made for reclaiming the property at
any time.
5 Commonwealth v. Dollar Savings Bank, 259 Pa. 139, 102 Ad. 569 (1917).
6 E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 393.060 (Supp. 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 282 (1958).
7 E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 393.080 (Supp. 1960); N.Y. ABAND. PROP. § 400.
8 E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1502 (Supp. 1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 98.322 (Supp.
1957). .
9 E.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1505 (Supp. 1960); N.Y. AaAND. PROP. § 700.
10 See In re Lyons Estate, 175 Wash. 115, 26 P.2d 615 (1933); LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 157 (1959).
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volving unclaimed property, however, the domicile of the owner is not known.
Thus, the courts have been forced to evolve other tests in order to determine
whether a state has power over property it is attempting to take.
Most of the early cases dealing with unclaimed property involved statutes
seeking to escheat inactive bank deposits.' The apparent rationale of the state's
power of escheat in these situations is that the location of the obligor and holder
of intangibles is within the state escheating (or taking for custody; the difference
is unimportant in this connection). Much the same problems are dealt with in
those cases in which the state sought to escheat abandoned monies which had
been deposited with public utilities.12 Here again the power to escheat the in-
tangibles seems to be based on the unspoken rationale of a right arising from
the location of the obligor within the state.
A new problem of right to escheat appeared in the case of Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Moore.13 The Supreme Court reviewed a declaratory judgment of
the New York Court of Appeals, holding valid a New York statute which sought
to escheat the proceeds of abandoned life insurance issued by foreign corpora-
tions on residents of the state of New York. The Court upheld the statute insofar
as it applied to policies insuring persons who continued to reside in the state
until the maturity of the policy, if the beneficiary was also a resident at that time.
Refusing to consider the possibility of other states' escheating these obligations,
the Court said: "The question is whether the state of New York has sufficient
contacts with the transactions here in question to justify the exertion of the power
to seize abandoned money due to its residents."'
14
Here it seems that the Court bases the power of escheat on "contacts." It
upholds the statute insofar as it applies to a transaction which took place in the
state where the obligee of company was resident at the time his claim matured.
The Connecticut Mutual Life case represents the Supreme Court's first handling
of state claims to monies where the obligor as well as the obligee may have a
domicile outside the state escheating; its holding clearly permits escheat from a
corporation on its obligations outside the state of the corporation's domicile.
The converse of the problem in Connecticut Mutual Life arose in Standard
Oil Co. v. New Jersey.15 In that case, New Jersey attempted to escheat unclaimed
dividends and stock certificates held by Standard Oil, a New Jersey corporation,
which had no contact with the state, except the fact of its incorporation under
New Jersey's laws and the presence of a statutory agent. The last known residence
of most of the obligees was outside New Jersey. Holding the statute valid, the
Court said that New Jersey, since it possessed the power to seize the obligations
by service upon the corporation, had the power to act on the rights of the parties
m those obligations, i.e., to escheat them. "Situs of an intangible is fictional," the
Court said, "but control over parties whose judicially coerced action can make
effective rights created by the chose in action enables the court with such control
to dispose of the rights of the parties to such an intangible."' 6 The Court, it can
be seen, made no distinction between control over parties and the power to escheat.
Cast in terms of the test in the Connecticut Mutual Life case, the Court said that
there are sufficient "contacts" for escheat purposes wherever a state may obtain
service on the parties. Since service by publication has, in most cases, been held
11 Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923); Provident Institution for
Savings v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660 (1911); Germantown Trust Co. v. Powell, 265 Pa. 71, 108
Adt. 441 (1919); Commonwealth v. Dollar Savings Bank, 259 Pa. 139, 102 At. 569 (1917);
Greenough v. People's Savings Bank, 39 R.I. 100, 94 Atl. 706 (1915).
12 Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. v. Bennet, 154 Misc. 106, 277 N.Y. Supp. 202 (1935);
In re Philadelphia Electric *Co., 352 Pa. 457, 43 A.2d 116 (1945).
13 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
14 Id. at 548.
15 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
16 Id. at 439-40.
RECENT DECISIONS
to be sufficient with regard to obligees whose location is not known,17 this means
that a right to escheat exists wherever personal service may be had upon the
holder of the obligation.
The chance of multiple escheat by many states of the same obligation, from
a holder doing business in each of them, was ruled out by the Court when it
held that the full faith and credit clause barred such a possibility.1 8
The Standard Oil case was the last to be decided by the Supreme Court on
the question of escheat of unclaimed property. Since 1951, however, the courts
of New Jersey, relying on the Standard Oil and Connecticut Mutual Life decisions,
have considerably broadened the area of escheat of unclaimed properties. A 1953
case involved the taking of unclaimed dividends of a domestic corporation where
many of the last known addresses of the owners were outside the state.19 A later
case also allowed the escheat of dividends of a foreign corporation where the last
known addresses were within New Jersey.20 In one case, in which several corpora-
tions were joined as defendants, the state was permitted to take both unclaimed
wages earned outside the state by employees of a domestic corporation, and wages
earned within the state by employees of a foreign corporation.2 1 The only case
discovered in which a state came as intervenor into the courts of another state
to dispute its right to escheat resulted in a ruling that the rights of the state of
domicile are superior to those of the state of the obligee's last known address.22 A
later case, however, held that this right was only superior, and not exclusive, so
that if the state of domicile did not choose to take the obligation New Jersey
could do so.
23
The pattern presented by these cases illustrates the full range of possible
escheats at present. It shows the conflicts and competition between the states in
this area, conflicts encouraged by the breadth of the Connecticut Mutual Life and
Standard Oil rulings.
Commonwealth v. Western Union presents a new extension of the power of
states to escheat. The statute under which the proceeding was begun is in the
most general form, applying to all unclaimed property "within or subject to the
control of" Pennsylvania.2 4 Western Union contested the taking on the ground
that there were no monies within the state which could be escheated. The court
answered this argument by saying that it was the obligations held by the com-
pany that were subject to escheat. The remainder of the court's opinion was di-
rected toward establishing that the Commonwealth possessed the power to escheat
these obligations, that it had proper jurisdiction over them, and that its proceed-
ings had been compatible with due process of law. The problem of jurisdiction
17 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951); Security Savings Bank v. Cali-
fornia, 263 U.S. 282 (1928); Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1896).
18 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 241 U.S. 428 (1951).
19 State v. United States Steel Corp., 12 N.J. 38, 95 A.2d 734 (1953).
20 State v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 45 N.J. Super. 259, 132 A.2d 550 (1957).
21 State v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 29 N.J. Super. 116, 101 A.2d 598 (1953).
22 State v. American Sugar Refinery Co., 20 N.J. 286, 119 A.2d 767 (1956).
23 State v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 45 N.J. Super. 259, 132 A.2d 550 (1957).
24 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 333 (1958):
(b) Whensoever the owner, beneficial owner of, or person entitled to any
real or personal property within or subject to the control of the Com-
monwealth or the whereabouts of such owner, beneficial owner or person
entitled has been or shall be and remain unknown for the period of seven
successive years, such real or personal property together with rents, profits
and accretions, or interest thereof or thereon shall escheat to the Com-
monwealth. ...
(c) Whensoever any real or personal property within or subject to
the control of the Commonwealth has been or shall be and remain un-
claimed for the period of seven successive years, such real or personal
property together with the rents, profits, accretions and interest there-
of or thereon, shall escheat to the Commonwealth ....
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gave the court little trouble. Previous Supreme Court decisions had established
the doctrine that escheat proceedings are in rem and that jurisdiction over the
res may be obtained by personal service upon the holder and service by publica-
tion upon the obligee .2  Likewise, the court disposed of the problem of notice
by citing Holingsworth v. Barbour,26 wherein it was held that seizure of the res
itself constitutes constructive notice to all parties. It added that there had been
sufficient notice by publication to render the question of notice beyond contention.
2 7
After holding that there was sufficient notice to satisfy procedural due process,
and thereby to prevent further claims against Western Union by the obligors, the
court disposed of the argument that the company might be subject to claims
by other states by referring to the Standard Oil case and the principle that multiple
escheat is barred by the full faith and credit clause. These considerations do not
answer the first question to be asked: Did Pennsylvania have the power to escheat
these obligations? The court in Western Union does not rely on any one decision
to settle this question. Rather, it draws from both Connecticut Mutual Life and
Standard Oil in locating a basis for state power. Connecticut Mutual Life, it should
be remembered, allowed a taking from a foreign corporation on the basis of
residence of the obligee and a transaction within the state..Standard Oil upheld
escheat by the domiciliary state upon its domestic corporation regardless of resi-
dence or the situs of the transaction. In Western Union, escheat was allowed upon
a foreign corporation where the proven facts showed the state's only contact with
the company's obligation was that the transaction creating it had taken place within
its boundaries. The court said:
The Western Union Telegraph Company is not domiciled in Penn-
sylvania, but it is subject to the jurisdiction since it transacts business
here in many offices, and personal service was obtained on it in Penn-
sylvania. Moreover all the transactions which are the bases of the respond-
ent's outstanding obligations occurred in Pennsylvania by virtue of the fact
that the senders deposited their money in Western Union offices located
in Pennsylvania.
28
The holding is therefore based on a combination of the two cases referred
to. The dicta in Standard Oil, that escheat may be had wherever service can be
obtained, is combined with an extension of the holding in Connecticut Mutual
Life, that residence of the obligee and the origin of the obligation within the
state are sufficient. Neither the obligor nor the obligee need be domiciled in Penn-
sylvania under this test; it is sufficient that the obligation arose within the state.
This decision does not perhaps go as far as Mr. Justice Reed's dictum in Standard
Oil; it represents, however, a step in that direction.
In order to evaluate the decision in Western Union, it may be profitable to
consider which other states could have had a right to escheat these obligations.
Until Pennsylvania acted, it is clear that the state of the obligor's last known
address, the state of domicile of the corporation,2 9 and, perhaps, with regard to
the obligations involved here, the state wherein a draft was issued to the payee
of the money order, might have escheated these obligations. Each of these states
could have some contact with the obligation being escheated.30 The question of
25 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951); Security Saving Bank v. Cali-
fornia, 263 U.S. 282 (1923); Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1896).
26 29 U.S. (4 Peters) 465 (1830).
27 It is submitted that in the light of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950), the court's reasoning as to the problem of notice may be considered in-
adequate. The issue of notice, however, is not the central problem presented by the case.
28 Commonwealth v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 400 Pa. 343, 162 A.2d 617, 621
(1960).
29 Indeed, New York, the domiciliary state of Western Union, had already escheated
$725.85 in obligations held by Western Union and arising in Pennsylvania. The Dauphin
County Court, protesting that New York had no right to that money, nevertheless deducted
the amount from that petitioned by the Commonwealth. 73 Dauphin County Rep. 160 (1958).
30 Cf. Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Connecticut Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v.
Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 559 (1948).
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which state had the best right to the obligations is beyond the scope of this com-
ment, but several factors indicate that some test is clearly necessary.
Dissenting in Connecticut Mutual Life, Mr. Justice Jackson said:
While we may evade it for a time, the competition and conflicts be-
tween states for "escheats" will force us to some lawyer-like definition
of state power over the subject .... This competition and conflict be-
tween states already require us, in all fairness to them, to define the basis
on which a state may escheat.5 '
Two years later, in his dissent in Standard Oil, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with
whom Mr. Justice Jackson joined, said: "The Constitution ought not be placed
in an unseemly light by suggesting that the constitutional rights of the several states
depend on, and are terminated by a race of diligence." 3 2 Urging that the Court
should settle and prevent such a race Justice Frankfurther went on to say: "The
right to resort to this Court for adjustment of conflicting interests among several
states has been placed in the Constitution to avoid crude remedies of self-help in
the settlement of interstate controversies." 33
Some authorities still see, in the present situation, the danger of multiple
escheats:
We have therefore within the space of three years, two Supreme Court
opinions which, when taken together, cause great concern to anyone who
must deal with abandoned property subject to multiple escheat. The
Standard Oil case dearly pointed out that the state of incorporation may
escheat funds abandoned by non-residents. On the other hand, the Moore
case stands for the proposition that the state of domicile of a missing
beneficiary has sufficient jurisdiction to escheat insurance policy pro-
ceeds. Consequently, on the basis of these two cases it is clear that the
possibility of multiple claims in the field of escheat of corporate stocks
and dividends is a reality.34
No appellate cases involving double escheat have been noted.
The New Jersey decisions cited above show another -inadequacy in the law
of escheat. Those decisions and the principal case indicate that a state acting
promptly may get a disproportionate windfall in unclaimed obligations. This is
so because of the retroactive nature of escheat statutes. There is also, under the
present law, a temptation to lower the number of years that property need re-
main unclaimed before becoming subject to taking by the state.33
If a single test is to be adopted, that of the place of origin of the obligation
might well serve. Such a test would result in an equitable division of the benefits
of unclaimed property laws, while providing one easily identifiable situs where
escheat can take place.3 6 Such a test would be consistent with the holdings in
Connecticut Mutual Life and in Western Union. Whatever the test adopted and
whether this task of reconciliation is performed by an act of Congress or by a
judicial decision,3 7 it is clear that some method of balancing the conflicting claims
of the states is needed.
Thomas R. Joyce, Jr.
31 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 563 (1948).
32 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 444 (1951).
33 Ibid.
34 McBride, Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes, and the Corporation Lawyer, 14 Bus.
LAW. 1062, 1069 (1959).
,35 Note, Escheat of Corporate Stocks and Dividends, 27 IND. L.J. 113, 117 (1951).
36 For a strong argument suggesting that the place of domicile of the corporation is the
best single criterion of escheat, see Note, 65 Hagv. L. Rv. 1408 (1952).
37 Cf. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939), cited in dissenting opinion in Standard
Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 444 (1951).
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FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-ARREsT-STATE LAW GOVERNS PRO-
PRIETY OF ARREST MADE UNDER FEDERAL WARRANT WHERE FEDERAL RULES ARE
SILENT. -An agent of the Internal Revenue Service, accompanied by a state
police officer, arrested Macri in his home under a warrant issued pursuant to an
indictment charging the accused with failure to purchase a gambling tax stamp.'
The officers, fearing that Macri would destroy incriminating evidence, perfected
the arrest by breaking into his home without demanding entry or stating the pur-
pose of their visit. A search made incident to the arrest turned up a copy of the
Armstrong Daily News, pens, pads, and two bundles of currency, which the officers
confiscated. The accused moved before trial, in the United States District Court
for Connecticut, to suppress this evidence and to have it returned to him on the
grounds that the search was illegal because made without a search warrant and
that it was not a search incident to lawful arrest because the arrest was not made
according to the law of Connecticut. Held: motion to suppress granted and motion
for return of property denied. Where the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
do not speak, the court said, state law governs. Since Connecticut state law re-
quires that state officers demand entry and state their authority and purpose before
breaking into a dwelling, the arrest by a federal officer was not in accord with
state law and therefore was illegal. United States v. Macri, 185 F. Supp. 144 (D.
Conn. 1960).
It has long been held that evidence obtained through an unreasonable search
and seizure is inadmissible in a federal court.2 A search is unreasonable if not
pursuant to a search warrant issued on probable cause.3 Even without a search
warrant, a search of the premises under the immediate control of the person
arrested is not in itself unreasonable, provided the arrest is lawful.4 The search
in the present case was not attacked as being unreasonable for lack of a search
warrant; the reasonableness depended upon the validity of the arrest.
At common law, the authority of officers to break doors in order to make an
arrest was drastically limited.5 The concern of the law for the privacy of the indi-
vidual is summed up in the adage, "a man's house is his castle." In the 15th cen-
tury, it was recorded that the sheriff could not break the door of a man's home to
arrest him.6 The common law, however, did recognize the right of police officers
to break the doors to arrest for a felony.7 Although the authorities differed some-
what as to what circumstances justified the breaking of doors, they universally
required that the officer demand entry and announce his purpose- and be refused
entry-before he could break in."
Federal officers executing search warrants are required by federal statute to
demand entry and announce their purpose and authority before breaking in.9
The proposed Code of Criminal Procedure of the American Law Institute would
require that Federal and state officers do so in cases of arrest warrants as well.'0
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §§ 4411, 7262.
2 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See 34 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 278
(1959).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizure, shall not be violated,
and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause. .. ."
4 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
5 See Y.B. 13 Edw. 4, f.g. (1473).
6 Semayne's Case, 5 Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (Ex. 1603).
7 Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456, (D.C. Cir. 1949). See ALEXANDER, THE
LAW OF ARREST, § 101, at 508 (1949). See Wilgus, Arrest Without Warrant, 22 MICH. L.
REv. 798.
8 Semayne's Case, 5 Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (Ex. 1603).
9 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1958).
10 ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28 (Off. Draft, 1930).
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However, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which ordinarily govern the
manner of executing a federal arrest warrant, are silent on the subject. 1
Because of the Federal Rules' silence, the court in Macri felt compelled to
turn to the state law in order to determine the propriety of the defendant's arrest.
The court interpreted the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Di Re'12 as indicating that Federal judges in this situation "must go to
the state law." 13
It is central to the evaluation of Macri to understand just what was dealt with
in Di Re. There, an arrest had been made without warrant by a state officer for
a violation of federal law; hence the case is distinguishable on its facts from Macri.
However, there is dictum which points to the result arrived at by the Macri court.
For instance, the Supreme Court says:
By one of the earliest acts of Congress, the principle of which is still retained,
the arrest by judicial process for a federal offense must be "agreeably
to the usual mode of process against offenders in such state." 14
This principle is made the major premise, as it were, for the Court's con-
clusion:
There is no reason to believe that state law is not an equally appropriate
standard by which to test arrests without warrant, except in those cases
where Congress has enacted a federal rule.15
The Macri court notes that the statutory provision relied on in Di Re requir-
ing conformity to state procedure has been repealed. This was the statutory em-
bodiment of what the Supreme Court considered the "principle" which is "still
retained." The statute was repealed to allow for the effects of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, viz:
This section was completely rewritten to omit all provisions superseded by
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules 3, 4, 5, 40, and 54(a) which
prescribe the procedure for preliminary proceedings and examinations before
United States judges and commissioners and for renxioval proceedings but
not for preliminary examinations before State magistrates.' 6
Further, Rule 57(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states: "If
no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court may proceed in any
lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any applicable statute." 17
The Note of the Advisory Committee (which drafted the Federal Rules)
speaks of this rule in the following terms: "One of the purposes of this rule is
to abrogate any existing requirement of conformity to State procedure on any point
whatsoever." (Emphasis added.)'
Although it may be argued that Rule 57(b) was meant to deal only with
courtroom and trial procedure, Whitman in his authoritative treatise on the rules
suggests that it applies to arrests as well.' 9 Further, it seems apparent from the
rules and the aforementioned reports and notes that the intent of the rules is to
11 FED. R. C iM. P. 4.
12 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
13 United States v. Macri, 185 F. Supp. 144, 147 (D. Conn. 1960).
14 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948).
15 Ibid.
16 See Annot., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3041, 10 (1951). See also Annot., 18 U.S.C.A. Leg.
History, 598 (1951) Statement of William W. Barron, chief reviser of the Federal Criminal
Laws:
Much work on part 2 was done in anticipation of the adoption of the pro-
posed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by the Supreme Court.
These rules will modify or supersede many criminal procedural sections.
Consequently we gave effect to changes they will make by revising modi-
fied sections and repealing superseded sections.
This revision of part 2 left a skeleton of former procedural statutes, which,
after the adoption of these rules, will represent only a small part of
criminal procedure.
17 FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b).
18 ADvisoRY CommrrTEE NOTE, 18 U.S.C.A. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b), 510 (1961).
19 See WHITMAN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22 (1950).
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provide a uniform federal criminal procedure, without requiring conformity to state
law on any point. At the very least, the rules and the circumstances surrounding
their adoption would seem to cast doubt on the continuing retention of the principle
of conformity to state law mentioned in the Di Re case.
On the basis of these considerations it is submitted that the court in Macri
was not bound to have recourse to state law to determine the validity of Macri's
arrest. It is true that in cases involving arrests by federal officers without warrant,
the courts have held that state law governs the propriety of the arrest.20 Never-
theless, in Macri the officer had a federal warrant; the manner of issuance, execu-
tion and return of such a warrant is governed by federal law. In the interest of
the uniformity envisioned by the framers of the Federal Rules, the law as to those
particulars not explicitly governed by the rules ought to be federal law. There
is no reason why federal officers executing the warrant of a federal court ought
to be held to possibly unreasonable state arrest law. Conversely, there may be
cases where state law does not hold officers to as high a standard of conduct as
does federal law. That many states do not enforce as high standards upon their
officers as does the federal government may be shown by the number of states
which admit illegally obtained evidence. 2'
Assuming, arguendo, that federal law governs the arrest in Macri, there is
ample federal precedent to indicate a decision. In Miller v. United States,22 the
Supreme Court imposed the requirements of demand and announcement of pur-
pose upon local officers of the District of Columbia, analogizing to 18 U.S.C.
section 3109, which imposes those requirements upon officers executing a search
warrant. This decision has been interpreted as imposing the requirement upon
federal officers in general. In Leahy v. United States,2 s the court said:
Section 3109 of Title 18 U.S.C. provides that unless an officer executing
a search warrant first gives notice of his authority and purpose and is then
refused admittance, he may not "break open" any door or window. The
same requirements apply to arrests. Miller v. United States .... 24
A further practical reason for the application of federal law in this instance
is the presence of exceptions to the general rule of demand and announcement.
The existence of an exception in a particular instance would be of great interest
to defendants and to federal law enforcement agencies. Here, for instance, the
contention was urged that an exception to the rule exists where it is suspected that
the defendant, if given warning, will destroy valuable evidence. The defendant,
Macri, possibly did destroy such evidence on the occasion of a previous arrest. Had
the court felt free to apply established federal law, rather than considering itself
bound to a prediction of what the courts of Connecticut might do if confronted by
the situation, it could have considered more fully such contentions as those of Mr.
Justice Traynor of California:
Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence, and
no basic constitutional guarantees are violated because an officer succeeds
in getting to a place where he is entitled to be more quickly than he would,
had he complied with ... the demand and explanation requirements of
section 844 (which) are a codification of the common law, (thus) they
may reasonably be interpreted as limited by common law rules that com-
pliance is not required if the officer's peril would have been increased or
the arrest frustrated. .... 25
20 United States v. Burgoes, 269 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942
(1960); Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Coplon,
185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952); United States v. Sipes, 132 F.
Supp. 537 (D. Tenn. 1955).
21 See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), especially the appendix thereto.
22 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
23 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 363 U.S. 810 (1960) (pending).
24 Id. at 489.
25 People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (1956).
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This is not to suggest that the court should or should not allow such an
exception. It is suggested, however, that freedom from the shackles of state
authority, some of it as in Macri- a century old,26 would enable the federal
courts to frame a more uniform and just law to govern federal criminal arrests.
In conclusion, it is suggested that the court arrived at the "right" decision,
in its holding that officers must demand entry and state their purpose before break-
ing into a house to make an arrest. It would have been better, though, had the
court not felt itself bound to refer to state law on the subject but had instead
established that, in arrests under federal warrants, the validity of the arrest is to
be determined under uniform federal standards. Such standards are readily avail-
able in federal decisional law.
Patrick Crooks
LABOR LAW - INJUNCTIONS - FEDERAL COURT MAY ENJOIN VIOLATION OF
No-STRi CLAUSE DESPITE PRovIsIoNs OF NORRIs-LAGUARDIA ACT. - Six in-
terstate motor carriers instituted six separate suits under section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act to enjoin a labor union from violating the no-strike or tie-up provisions
of separate collective bargaining agreements. On a finding that the union had
violated these provisions and that there had been a showing of consequent irre-
parable harm, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas issued
an injunction in each of the cases, reasoning that no labor dispute within the
meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was involved, and that section 301 conferred
jurisdictional authority to grant such relief. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, held: Affirmed. Federal courts have jurisdiction under section 301 to
issue injunctions to compel performance of contracts freely arrived at through the
collective bargaining process, and Norris-LaGuardia does not prohibit such relief
in situations not relevant to its purpose and policy. Teamsters Union v. Yellow
Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960), petition for cert. filed,
29 U.S.L. WEEK 3146 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1960) (No. 527).
Before the enactment of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, the question of
the availability of equitable relief in federal courts in cases involving labor disputes
had been considered clearly determined. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, passed in
1932, had provided in effect that federal courts had no jurisdiction to issue injunc-
tive relief in labor disputes.' That act, by its terms, was expressly applicable to all
but a few specified situations,2 and the courts gave the term labor dispute a broad
and liberal interpretation.3
Section 3014 was primarily intended to create federal jurisdiction over cases
26 Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822). This case holds that there is an exception to
the general rule requiring demand and announcement, where the officer or someone in the
house is in peril.
1 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958).
2 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) provides that a labor dispute is:
[Ajny controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or con-
cermag the association or representation of persons in negotiating . . . or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
3 See, e.g., Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940) (no
distinction between lawful and unlawful non-violent strikes); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary
Groc. Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938) (disputants not in an employer-employee relationship);
Wilson & Co. v. Bir, 27 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 105 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1939) (no
injunctive relief against strike in breach of contract).
4 LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT (Taft-Hartley Act § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952) provides:
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
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involving violations of contracts between employers and labor organizations. Al-
though the word "suits" is used in section 301, most federal courts, at least until
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills 5 was decided, nevertheless had limited the
scope of available relief to money damages.6 Thus, in W. I. Mead v. Teamsters
Union,7 where injunctive relief was sought under section 301 against a strike in
breach of the collective bargaining agreement, the court denied the petition, holding
that section 301 could not be read as a repeal by implication of Norris-LaGuardia,
and that the only relief available under the facts was an action for money damages."
Other courts generally adopted the same rationale in refusing injunctive relief-
namely, that section 301 was intended to provide only a federal forum for damage
actions, and this was so whether the action was brought by employers or by unions.9
In 1957, however, in the Lincoln Mills case, the Supreme Court held that
section 301 was not to be so stringently construed in every instance, and that a
federal court could compel an employer to abide by arbitration provisions in a
collective bargain. In that decision, the Court stated that section 301 was more
than procedural, and that:
Plainly, the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro
quo for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation
does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organi-
zations. It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these
agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial
peace can be obtained only in that way.' 0
The Court added that, in section 301 actions, a body of federal substantive law
was to be applied, fashioned by the courts from national labor laws, and that the
"range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem.""
Following the directive of the Court, agreements to arbitrate or to abide by
arbitration decisions have been enforced against both employers and labor organi-
zations.'" But, where the reverse of the quid pro quo has been sought to be enforced
-the no-strike provision-the conflict with the literal language of Norris-La-
Guardia has led to a revival of pre-Lincoln Mills reasoning. In A. H. Bull S.S. Co.
v. Seafarers' Int'l Union,'3 the Second Circuit held that section 301 could not be
read as a repeal of Norris-LaGuardia, and that Lincoln Mills was distinguishable
on its facts, the injunction there not having been directed against a strike-
activity expressly included within section 113(c) of Norris-LaGuardia. The court
held that whether or not the strike sought to be enjoined was a violation of the
agreement was immaterial, and that any resort under section 301 must necessarily
be confined to an action for money damages. In the most recent case on the issue,
the court has chosen to follow the reasoning in Bull Steamship.'
4
5 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
6 See, e.g., Aetna Freight Lines, Inc. v. Clayton, 228 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 950 (1956). But cf. Milk & Ice Cream Drivers v. Gillespie Milk Products
Corp., 203 F.2nd 650 (6th Cir. 1953) (unqualified use of the word "suits" authorizes in-
junctive process for full enforcement of substantive rights given).
7 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954).
8 See, W. H. Mead v. Teamsters Union, 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956) ($359,000
damage award given on theory that by striking without resorting to arbitration provisions
union had breached an implied agreement not to strike).
9 See, e.g., Sound Lumber Co. v. Local 2799, 122 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1954);
In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 192 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1951); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon,
81 F. supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd per curiam, 173 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 821 (1949).
10 353 U.S. 448, 452 (1957).
11 Id. at 457.
12 See, e.g., A. L. Kornman v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 264 F.2d 733 (6th
Cir.), ceft. denied, 361 U.S. 819 (1959); American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Tacoma
Smeltermen's Union, 175 F. Supp. 750 (W.D. Wash. 1960). But cf. Local 861 v. Stone &
Webster Eng'r Co., 163 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. La 1958) (refusal to enjoin lockout).
13 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
14 See Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenters' Dist. Council, 188 F. Supp. 382 (E.D.
La. 1960).
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In the present case, the court relies heavily on the quid pro quo concept,
stating that:
it seems reasonable to say that if the courts are to exercise jurisdiction for
the redress of violations of collective bargaining agreements according to
notions of federal common law, they are empowered to vouchsafe the in-
tegrity of a bargaining contract to the end that neither party shall be de-
prived of the fruits of their bargain.' 5
Relying upon the directive of Lincoln Mills, the court contends that the jurisdic-
tional limitations of Norris-LaGuardia should be read in the light of the language
and purpose of section 301, so that the "obvious purpose in the enactment of each
is preserved."
It should be noted that the emphatic prohibition of Norris-LaGuardia has
been subjected to 29 years of meaningful erosion. The Taft-Hartley Act provides
for injunctive relief on petition of the N.L.R.B. in specified situations.16 And the
Supreme Court has not hesitated to approve injunctive decrees, even though issued
in controversies coming within the literal language of the act, if such controversies
were not the kind intended to be included by the policy underlying Norris-La-
Guardia. In Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation" and Graham v. Brotherhood
of Firemen,'8 the Court held that Norris-LaGuardia did not, in cases of racial dis-
crimination, deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to compel compliance with the
mandates of the Railway Labor Act. And in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
v. Chicago R. & I.R. Co., the Court said that Norris-LaGuardia and other Labor
Laws must be accommodated, "so that the obvious purpose in the enactment of
each is preserved." 19
In Syres v. Oil Workers' Int'l Union,20 a case arising under the Taft-Hartley
Act, the Court held, per curiam, that an injunction could issue to enjoin enforce-
ment of a collective bargaining agreement from which Negroes had been excluded.
Significantly, the Court cited as authority Graham and Virginian Ry. And in
Lincoln Mills, the majority read all these cases as instances of "accommodation"
- that is, as situations where inapposite procedure was ignored, because the under-
lying policy of the legislation involved was not subverted or jeopardized.
Another consideration, referred to only impliedly in the present case, is that
by confining the remedial powers of section 301 to money damages only, the juris-
diction of the court to work full justice is partially emasculated. In at least two
situations where the question has been presented to a federal court on a petition
to remand,2 the court has acknowledged the presence of this emasculation. In
both instances, admitting an absence of power to give the injunctive relief requested,
the court nevertheless granted the remand, so that the actions could be decided
in a forum- a state court- where relief appropriate to the situation could be
granted.
State courts have not hesitated, in actions governed by section 301, to grant
injunctive relief in cases of the kind under consideration. In McCarroll v. Los
Angeles Dist. Council of Carpenters,22 the court admitted that the substantive law
15 Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 282 F.2d 345, 350 (10th Cir. 1960).
16 LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT § 10(j)(7)(1), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as
amended, 72 Stat. 945 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1958), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(1) (Supp.
1959). Section 10(j) authorizes the NLRB to seek injunctions against unfair labor prac-
tices after complaint by the General Counsel; § 160(1) requires that such relief be brought
as a prerequisite to complaints against secondary boycotts.
17 300 U.S. 515 (1936).
18 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
19 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
20 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
21 See Swift v. Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511 (D. Colo. 1959); Castle &
Cooke Terminals, Ltd. v. Local 137, 110 F. Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953).
22 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). See also
McLean Dist. Co. v. Brewery and Beverage Drivers, 254 Minn. 204, 94 N.W.2d 514 (1959),
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 917 (1960).
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to be applied under section 301 actions had to be a federal one, but held that,
where a state enforces a federal right, it should not be precluded from giving reme-
dies usually available in its own courts, even though such remedies might not be
available in a federal forum.
Whether or not the court in McCarroll is accurate in assuming that injunctive
relief is not an element of the substantive rights created by section 301, such a
remedy must be available to give meaning to the exercise of jurisdiction in these
disputes. It is not difficult to imagine situations where monetary damages would
be inadequate, and where injunctive relief is necessary to avoid irreparable harm.
One method of approach is to treat the question presented in the Yellow
Transit case as one involving only contract law. In Farrand Optical Co. v. Local
175,23 the court held that Norris-LaGuardia was inapplicable because there was
no labor dispute, the union having struck after the parties had reached an agree-
ment settling the dispute. And in American Smelting and Refining Co. v. Local
25,2 4 the cburt analogized to Lincoln Mills and granted an injunction pendente lite
where the union had gone out on strike without first having resorted to the griev-
ance procedure contained in the contract.
It is submitted, however, that the Yellow Transit decision faces the problem
directly, and follows the directive which was implicit, if not express, in Lincoln
Mills. It relies upon that case as recognizing a broad concept of jurisdictional
authority, "one which embraced all violations of labor contracts which had been
freely arrived at through the collective bargaining process." 25 Analyzing the pur-
pose and policy of Norris-LaGuardia, the court reasons:
Surely no one would seriously contend that § 301 was intended to open
the gates to the abuses of judicial injunctive power which Norris-LaGuardia
was designed to curb .... It is one thing to utilize an injunctive decree
for the negative purpose of interfering with full freedom of association,
self-organizing and designation of representatives to negotiate the terms
and conditions of employment. It is quite another to utilize the judicial
process to preserve and vouchsafe the fruits of a bargain which the parties
have freely arrived at through the exercise of collective bargaining rights. 26
In conclusion, it would seem that the Yellow Transit court has taken Lincoln
Mills at its word, and relied upon "judicial inventiveness" to fashion a remedy
effectuating and accommodating national labor laws. If federal courts can now
be trusted to avoid the chaos and arbitrariness that characterized pre-Norris-La-
Guardia decisions, then the decision of this court is defensible, and it demonstrates
the range and nature of judicial inventiveness that may be anticipated where
violations of no-strike clauses are presented. The principle of quid pro quo in labor
contracts is still recognized and defended,27 but whether labor relations in general
have matured during the past 30 years to the level of sophistication demanded by
the principles of contract law is a question perhaps beyond any range of judicial
inventiveness. It was stated in the most recent opinion on the problem: "Thus,
it is not at all clear what the Supreme Court will hold when presented with the




23 143 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
24 175 F. Supp. 750 (W.D. Wash. 1960). See also Johnson & Johnson v Textile Workers
Union, 184 F. Supp. 359 (D.N.J. 1960).
25 Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345, 349 (10th
Cir. 1960).
27 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). But see Baltimore Contractors v.
Carpenters' Dist. Council, 188 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. La. 1960).
28 Baltimore Contractors v. Carpenters' Dist. Council, 188 F. Supp. 382, 384 (E.D. La.
1960). See also Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.Y. Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 342
(1960). (Court states that if the scope of Norris-LaGuardia is to be cut down, Congress
should do it.)
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TORTS - CONSORTIUM - WIFE H-As No CAusE OF AcTION FOR Loss OF HER
HUSBAND'S CONSORTIUM DUE TO NEGLIGENCE OF THIRD PARTY.- On December
28, 1959, plaintiff, Israel Neuberg, having sustained serious injuries as the result
of an automobile accident, instituted a suit to recover for these injuries and pecu-
niary losses. His wife joined as plaintiff in the action to recover for the loss of
her husband's society, sexual companionship, and services. Defendant moved to
strike the wife's cause of action; the Court of Common .Pleas of Philadelphia
County granted the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held:
Affirmed. A married woman has no cause of action for the loss of her husband's
consortium caused by the negligence of a third party. Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa.
146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960).
The problem of granting recovery to a wife for the loss of her husband's con-
sortium has perplexed the courts for a number of years. No less than four different
results have emerged: (1) deny recovery for loss due to negligence of a third
party;" (2) grant recovery when the loss is due to intentional acts of a third
party; 2 (3) grant recovery for loss due to negligence of third party;$ (4) deny
recovery for the negligent act of a third party, and, further, deny a similar right
of recovery to the husband for loss resulting from the same negligent act.
4
The courts' inability to define adequately the term "consortium" is one of
the factors that account for this variety of holdings. The term has been thought
to comprise two aspects- the services owed to either spouse in the marital rela-
tionship, and sentimental aspects, i.e., society, companionship and conjugal affec-
tion.5 Many courts have denied recovery to the wife for loss of her husband's
services.6 Some courts have granted recovery to the wife for the loss of society,
companionship and conjugal affection;7 others have denied recovery."
The term consortium, for present purposes, will be used as indicating the
entire relationship of husband and wife in the marital state.9 This marital rela-
tionship at common law was essentially singular in nature:
mhe husband had almost absolute control over the person of his wife;
she was in a condition of complete dependence; could not contract in her
own name; was bound to obey; she had no will and her legal existence was
merged into that of her husband, so that they were termed and regarded as
one in law, the husband being that one.10
Any injury to a man's wife was considered an injury to him for which he could
seek legal redress per quod consortium amisit." After the passage of the Married
Woman's Acts, which put the wife on a parity with her husband,12 the courts were
divided on the problem of whether or not she had the same rights and legally
protected interests that her husband had at common law.13 The courts' answer
to this problem is another explanation for the conflicting case law in this area.
1 Nickel v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205 (1955).
2 Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923).
3 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
4, See Marri v. Stamford St. Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911).
5 See Neuberg v. Bobowizc, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960); Montgomery v. Stephen,
359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium,
22 MimH. L. Rpv. 1 (1923).
6 E.g., Coastal Tank Lines v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d 82 (1955).
7 E.g., Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98 N.W.2d 669 (S.D. 1959).
8 Seymour v. Union News Co., 217 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1954); Felice v. United States,
217 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1954).
9 See Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98 N.W.2d 669, 672 (S.D. 1959): "Consortium is a right
growing out of the marital relationship. This term includes the right of either spouse to the
society, companionship, conjugal affections and assistance of the other." Holbrook, supra note
5, at 2: "[Consortium] . . . includes the right of one spouse to the conjugal fellowship of
the other, to the other's company, cooperation and aid in the conjugal relation."
10 King v. City of Owensboro, 187 Ky. 21, 218 S.W. 297, 298 (1920).
11 Crocker v. Crocker, 98 Fed. 702 (C.C.D. Mass. 1889).
12 But see Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952).
13 Id.
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Under these statutes, the majority of courts has held that the husband still
has a right to recover for the loss of his wife's consortium due to the negligent acts
of a third party,' 4 but denies a similar right in the wife.' 5 This approach has been
severely condemned by many legal writers' 6 as not being supported by either logic
or justice. The courts so holding recognize the inconsistency of their position. For
example, in Larocca v. American Chain and Cable Co., 7 the court denied recovery
to the wife but stated:
It is the life of the law to adjust the weight of a precedent in response to
the common standards of society . .. to restore... the equilibrium between
precedent and justice. Perhaps our Supreme Court will find in this case
reason to consider the entire subject. At the moment .. dismissal . . . was
in accord with the existing law.' s
The strict judicial self-restraint on the question of recovery for the loss of
consortium, 19 due to negligent acts of a tortfeasor, does not appear when the courts
grant recovery to the wife for loss of consortium, due to intentional acts which
result in an interference in the marital relationship by a third party, with the co-
operation of the husband.20 It is submitted that the courts' judgments are justified
on the dual grounds that: (1) Injuries might be presumed when a marriage has
been violated because of the intentional tort;2' and, (2) that since the husband is
a joint wrongdoer, the wife has the sole cause of action.
22
When the courts deal with negligent torts, they deny recovery to the wife
because, they claim, to give recovery would, in effect, be granting double recovery
for a single negligent act. 23 They also claim that damages would only be a matter
of conjecture. 2 4 It would seem that if these objections were valid, they would apply
equally as well when the husband is suing for the loss of his wife's consortium;
however, very few courts seem to take this into consideration.
2"
With the exception of a decision rendered in 192 1,26 which was effectively over-
ruled four years later,'2 7 the first suit which granted recovery to the wife was the
leading case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co. 8 in 1950. Plaintiff's husband was injured
14 Vernon v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 218 S.C. 402, 63 S.E.2d 53 (1951):
15 Smith v. United Constr. Workers, 122 So. 2d 153, (Ala. 1960); Don v. Knapp, 306
N.Y. 675, 117 N.E.2d 128 (1954); Franzen v. Zimmerman, 127 Colo. 381, 256 P.2d 897
(1953).
16 See, e.g., PROSSER, TORTS 104 (2d ed. 1955); Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L.
REV. 460 (1934); Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1930).
17 23 N.J. Super. 195, 92 A.2d 811 (1952).
18 Id. at 814.
19 See Larocca v. American Chain and Cable Co., 23 N.J. Super. 195, 92 A.2d 811
(1952).
20 Knighten v. McClain, 227 N.C. 682, 44 S.E.2d 79 (1947) (wife recovered from third
party for alienation of affections); Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940) (wife
recovered from third part for selling intoxicating liquor to husband); Oppenheim v. Kridel,
236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923) (wife recovered from third person for criminal con-
versation); Moberg v. Scott, 38 S.D. 422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917) (wife recovered from third
party for selling dope to her husband). Contra, Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., 156 Ohio St. 295,
102 N.E.2d 444 (1951) (recovery denied to wife for the intentional withholding of informa-
tion); Anderson v. McGill Club, 51 Nev. 16, 266 Pac. 913 (1928) (court recognized right of
wife to recover for intentional torts committed, but refused to extend her right to recover when
husband was enticed away to play poker).
21 See, e.g., Eclov v. Birdsong, 166 F.2d 960 (App. D.C. 1948).
22 Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940); Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156,
140 N.E. 227 (1923); Holbrook, supra note 5.
23 Tobiassen v. Polley, 96 N.J.L. 66, 114 Atl. 153, 154 (1921):
If a wife be allowed to recover . . . on the loss of the earning capacity of
her husband, he could bring his action and recover for the same element of
damage, and thus there would be two separate recoveries .. . and this could
not have been the legislative intent. ...
24 Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R.R., 50 Cal. App. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449
(1958).
25 Ibid. But see Bolger v. Boston Elevated Ry., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910).
26 Hipp v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921).
27 Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
28 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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while employed by defendant. He suffered severe and permanent injuries to his
body; as a consequence, plaintiff was deprived of his assistance, aid, and enjoyment
-specifically sexual relations. Judge Clark, delivering the opinion of the court, held
that a wife has a cause of action for loss of consortium resulting from a negligent
injury to her husband.
29
Since the decision in Hitaffer, many other courts have allowed recovery to
the wife under similar circumstances. 30 At least one state has enacted legislation
similar to the rule in Hitaffer. l Some of the courts that have followed the decision
laid down in 1950 have seen fit to make distinctions when granting recovery to the
wife rather than to adopt the rule in its entirety.3 2 The net result of the extension
of the common law rule granting recovery to the wife for the loss of her husband's
consortium has been confusion.
33
Some courts when dealing with this problem have denied recovery to the wife
for loss of her husband's consortium caused by the negligent act of a third party,
and, in addition, have denied the right of the husband to recover for the loss of
his wife's consortium.3 4 The reasoning of the courts so holding is: the husband has
always had the right at common law to recover for the loss of his wife's consortium
because she had no legal capacity to sue. Since the Married Woman's Acts have
put the woman on an equal footing with the man, the reason for granting the
husband recovery no longer exists. Therefore, neither husband nor wife has a cause
of action.33
A majority of the court in the Neuberg case have realized the logic of this
position. Speaking through Justice Eagen, the court said:
The husband's right to recover on this theory is without present day justifica-
tion. The historical pillars which for decades had been regarded as lending
support to this monument to the Lord are today so effectively undermined
29 The court also held that the purpose of the Longshoreman's Act was not to deny a
woman, in her own right, a cause of action against her husband's employer for the breach of
an independent duty owing her, notwithstanding a statute which provided that defendant
would be liable exclusively to those of his employees within the ambit of the act. This part of
the decision was, however, subsequently overruled by Smither and Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d
220 (D.C. Cir. 1957). This case was followed by Thibodeaux v. McDermott Co., 276 F.2d
42, 48 (D'C. Cir. 1960): "But Hitaffer while launched and afloat never really got underway."
30 E.g., Missouri Pacific Transp. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957);
Acuff v. Sclmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956).
31 ORE. REv. STAT. ch. 108, § 108.010 (1959):
All laws which impose or recognize civil disabilities upon a wife which are
not imposed or recognized as existing as to the husband hereby are repealed;
and all civil rights belonging to the husband not conferred upon the wife
prior to June 14, 1941, or which she does not have at common law, hereby
are conferred upon her, including, among other things, the right of action
for loss of consortium of her husband. (Emphasis added.)
32 Louisville and Nashville Ry. v. Lunsford, 116 S.E.2d 232 (Ga. 1960) (wife cannot
recover when husband receiving benefits under Federal Employer's Liability Act); Lampe v.
Lagomarcino, 100 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1959) (followed the rule set out in Acuff v. Schmit, 248
Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956), but refused to grant recovery when husband died a few
minutes after a car crash); Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77
S.E.2d 24 (1953) (Limits wife's recovery to only those injuries for which her husband does
not have a cause of action).
33 An excellent example of this confusion can be found in the way California has handled
cases of this type in the last few years. The Deshotel case "disapproved" of the language used
in the case of Gist v. Frend, 36 Cal. App. 2d 247, 288 P.2d 1003 (1955), but held that the
question of right of recovery was not yet settled in California. West v. City of San Diego, 346
P.2d 479 (Cal. App. 1959), reaffirmed the position taken in the Deshotel case, that the
question was not settled in California, did not expressly overrule the Gist case, but held that
a man has no right to recover for the loss of his wife's consortium. The court held that this
problem "[I]ndicates recovery should be denied to the husband as well as to the wife for loss
of consortium until directly allowed by legislative action."
34 E.g., West v. City of San Diego, 346 P.2d 479 (Cal. App. 1959); Helmstetler v. Duke
Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611, 614 (1945): "But if the legislative intent of equality
is to prevail, the same cause of action which is denied to the wife may not be retained or
preserved to the husband."
35 Cf. Bolger v. Boston Elevated Ry., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910).
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by remedial legislation which recognized the status of the wife as equal
to that of her spouse that, in an increasing number of jurisdictions, they are
being razed rather than looked to for further and extended service ...
[E]fforts must be made to disentangle from the wife's recovery the con-
stituents of the husband's cause of action. . . . Indeed, the emancipation
argues for the restriction or abolition of these actions rather than their
extension.36
Therefore, the effect that the Neuberg court has had on the whole field of
consortium is to deny the wife a right to recover for the loss of her husband's
consortium using as its reasoning the absurdity of allowing the husband recovery in
similar circumstances. Thus, the significance of this case is not the holding, but the
reasoning supporting the holding. It would seem that, in the future, if Pennsylvania
has a case appealed to the Supreme Court where a husband is seeking relief for
the loss of his wife's consortium due to negligence of a third party, the husband's
prayer will be denied.
A majority of the courts in the United States, while failing to give the wife
the same degree of recovery her husband has, and realizing the incongruous
position of the law in its status quo, have felt that the only solution to the dilemma
was to let the legislature handle it.3 7 It is submitted that the courts should take the
position that, because they have created such an anomaly in the law, and that since
the reason for this anomaly exists no longer, they have the duty to either extend
the common-law doctrine of consortium or abolish it altogether.
That the woman today is on a parity with the man in the eyes of the law is
"too obvious for comment. ' 38 However, the seven jurisdictions following Hitaffer,5
and advocating an extension of the common law doctrine, should not prevail since:
(1) these courts have, as a general rule, attributed a very broad meaning to the term
consortium4°--a meaning that could lead to very extensive liability for the tort-
feasor;4 1 (2) the courts should realize that the wife is no longer a "personal chattel"
of the husband and that the reason for granting him relief for the loss of his wife's
consortium no longer exists.4 2 The often quoted passage of Mr. Justice Holmes is
particularly illustrative:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
36 Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960).
37 Smith v. United Construction Workers, 122 So. 2d 153, 154-55 (Ala. 1960):
[I]f a change in this common law is to be made it is a legislative rather than
a judicial function to decide whether it is more desirable in the public
interest to take away the husband's cause of action for loss of consortium
which has existed since the beginning of our jurisprudence or to recognize a
similar right in the wife which has never before been considered to exist.
38 Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960).
39 Michigan: Montgomery v. Stephen, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W. 2d 227 (1960). South
Dakota: Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98 N.E.2d 669 (S.D. 1959). Georgia: Bailey v. Wilson, 100
Ga. App. 405, 111 S.E.2d 106 (1959). Arkansas: Missouri Pacific Transp. Co. v. Miller, 227
Ark. 351, 299 S.E.2d 41 (1957); Illinois: Dani v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960). Iowa:
Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.E. 2d 480 (1956). Mississippi: Delta Chevrolet Co. v.
Waid, 211 Miss. 256, 51 So. 2d 443 (1951). See excellent commentary for the proposition that
wife's right should be co-extensive with husband's: Note, 12 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 329 (1937).
40 Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98 N.E.2d 669 (S.D. 1959).
41 An interesting decision, which adequately portrays the judicial temperament when
dealing with cases of the kind discussed in this article, was given in Hill v. Sibley Memorial
Hospital, 108 F. Supp. 739, 741 (D.D.C. 1952):
The common law should continually be reappraised and reinterpreted to
meet changing circumstances. This court confesses that it has been difficult
for it on the basis of natural justice to reach the conclusion that this type of
action will not lie. When a child loses the love and companionship of a
parent, it is deprived of something that is indeed valuable and precious.
Courts should ever be alert to widen the circle of justice to conform to the
changing needs of society. (Emphasis added.)
42 The jurisdictions that now hold that neither party has a cause of action for the loss of
the other's consortium due to negligence of a third party are: California: West v. City of San
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upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past.
43
If the courts could agree that loss of consortium due to negligent acts of a third
party was an actionable wrong and could limit recovery to persons who have lost
the sexual companionship of their partners, then, perhaps, recovery should be
permitted; however, if these courts continue to speak in terms of the total marital
relationship, and grant or deny recovery on these grounds, unfortunate results
would obtain. If no such agreement can be reached, then it is submitted that the
right to recover should be abolished in both parties for the loss of consortium due
to negligent acts of a third party-damnum absque injuria.
Robert G. Berry
TORTS - RELEASE OF JOINT TORTFEASORS - DOCUMENT STYLED "COVENANT
NOT TO SUE" HELD TO AMOUNT TO RELEASE.- Plaintiffs sued Charles L. Baker
& Company, Charles L. Baker and C. M. Howell for allegedly false representations
in connection with the sale of stock. While this matter was being adjudicated, one
of the defendants, C. M. Howell, approached the plaintiffs and entered into a
"9covenant" with them, in' which the plaintiffs agreed not to sue Howell on any of
the matters then at issue. The plaintiffs reserved the right to sue any of the other
defendants in that suit and it was provided that, if the plaintiffs attempted to
breach the coirenant by suing Howell, the "covenant" could be pleaded by him
"as a defense in bar or abatement of any action." A stipulation to dismiss Howell
without prejudice was then filed with the trial court; this was followed immediately
by a motion for summary judgment on the part of the remaining defendants, who
based their arguments on the "covenant" that had been signed with Howell. The
trial court granted the motion and plaintiffs appealed to the Colorado Supreme
Court. Held: Affirmed. The document was a release rather -than a covenant not
to sue and the release of one joint tortfeasor automatically released all the others.
Price v. Baker, 352 P.2d 90 (Colo. 1959).
The Colorado court admittedly ignored the expressed intent of the parties
to the agreement, and instead focused on the phrase "this instrument may be
pleaded as a defense" -which to the court's mind transformed the instrument
from a covenant into a release:
As former Supreme Court Justice Rutledge has observed, the result of con-
struing the document in this way is not only to frustrate the will of the parties,
but in effect to cheat the claimant out of his opportunity to proceed against the
remaining defendants, giving them an entirely unintended release; meanwhile the
one defendant who cared enough to settle the matter out of court is held to his agree-
Diego, 346 P.2d 479 (Cal. App. 1959); Rhode Island: Martin v. United Electric Rys. Co.,
71 R.I. 137, 42 A.2d 897 (1945); North Carolina: Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C.
821, 32 S.E.2d (1945); Connecticut: Marri v. Stamford St. Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 At. 582
(1911); Massachusetts: Bolger v. Boston Elevated Ry., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910).
43 HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920). .
1 Whether ?the court construes the document as a release or as a covenant, it is ad-
mittedly a valid contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant Howell. By allowing the
remaining defendants to plead this contract as a release it would seem that the court is
allowing a third party to bring an action on a contract to which he is at best an incidental
beneficiary - in fact, a beneficiary who was specifically intended not to benefit. This, anomaly
seems to be implicit in any decision which releases remaining tortfeasors when a contract
between the claimant and the settling tortfeasor attempts to reserve rights against these
others. 18 U. CINC. "L. REv. 378 (1949) hints at this difficulty. It would seem that if the
remaining defendants are benefiting, even though they are at best incidental beneficiaries,
the outcome does violence to the universally-accepted proposition that there can be no action
on a contract by a person who was not intended to benefit from the contract. RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 147 (1932).
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ment.2 These ramifications are recognized by most of the legal writers who treat
the subject3 and are seldom denied-or even mentioned for that matter- by
those courts which hold to a strict construction of the document.4 As a result, most
courts have retreated from the strict application of the compulsory release rule.
Virginia,5 Illinois, North Carolina," and Tennessee7 remain in the adamant min-
ority.
8
For all of this, it is still a fact that too often claimants who mean to release
only one tortfeasor will find themselves with their entire cause of action extin-
guished; 9 in this lies the key to the Price case. It is not so much the result reached
by the court or even its reasoning, that is important, so much as the underlying
principle on which its reasoning is based: so-called "release rule."
The "release rule" is simply the principle that the release of one joint tortfeasor
automatically results in the release of all others. 10 The release has been defined
as "the abandonment, relinquishment or giving up of a right or claim to the person
against whom the claim exists or the right is to be exercised or enforced.""" This
is to be contrasted with the so-called "covenant not to sue," which is an agreement
not to enforce an existing cause of action.'2 In a release the right to sue is given
up, while in the covenant a contract is made not to enforce the right. 3
In application, however, the supposedly contrary principles become difficult
to distinguish, because under current court procedure they result in precisely the
same disposition, at least as to the defendant who settles out of court.' 4 If a claimant
brings suit against a person whom he has released, -that person may plead the release
as a bar to the action. If a claimant brings suit against a person with whom he
has signed a covenant, while technically the person cannot plead it as a defense,
it has the effect of a defense since the court, using its equity power, will enjoin
the claimant from breaching the covenant. 5 In other words, the release destroys
the right, the covenant not to sue destroys the remedy and both result in judicial
refusal to compel double payment.
2 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
3 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 933-35 (1951); HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 711-12 (1956);
PROSSER, TORTS 244-45 (2d ed. 1955); COOLEY, TORTS § 80 (1930); 2 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 338A (1959); Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. Rzv. 413
(1937); Wigmore, Release to One Joint Tortfeasor, 17 ILL. L. REv. 563 (1923).
4 E.g., Morris v. Diem, 134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956); Roper v. Florida Pub.
Util. 'Co., 131 Fla. 709, 179 So. 904 (1938); Rust v. Schlaitzer, 175 Wash. 331, 27 P.2d
571 (1933).
5 Shortt v. Hudson Sup. & Equip. Co., 191 Va. 323, 60 S.E.2d 900 (1950); Gold-
stein v. Gilbert, 125 W. Va. 250, 23 S.E.2d 606 (1942).
6 Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956); Bryan v. Creaves 138 F.2d 337
(7th Cir. 1943), cert. den. 321 U.S. 778; Shapiro v. Embassy Dairy, Inc., 112 F.Supp. 696
(E.D.N.C. 1953).
7 Byrd v. Crowder, 166 Tenn. 215, 60 S.W.2d 171 (1933). But see Memphis St. Ry.
Co. v. Williams, 338 S.W.2d 639 (Tenn. 1959).
8 Of the states which are generally considered strict constructionists, that is, those which
tend whenever possible to construe a doubtful document as a release, West Virginia goes
farthest; it has construed admittedly good covenants as releasing the remaining tortfeasors.
Shortt v. Hudson .Sup. & Equip. Co., 191 Va. 323, 60 S.E.2d 900 (1950). Other states
which tend to construe these settlement documents as releases will not go so far, requiring,
at least, that there be something in the document which will allow the court to construe
it as a release rather than a covenant. E.g., Roper v. Florida Pub. Util. Co., 131 Fla. 709,
179 So. 904 (1938);'Byrd v. Crowder, 166 Tenn. 215, 60 S.W.2d 171 (1933). Recently
two states traditionally in the strict constructionist camp have by statute repudiated the
compulsory release rule, Florida in 1957 and Pennsylvania in 1956. FLA. STAT. § 54.28
(1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2085 (Supp. 1956).
9 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
10 Ibid.
11 Miller v. Estrabrook, 273 Fed. 143, 148 (4th Cir. 1921).
12 McDonald v. Goddard Grocery Co., 184 Mo. App. 432, 171 S.W. 650 (1914).
13 Goldstein v. Gilbert, 125 W. Va. 250, 23 S.E.2d 606 (1942).
14 McDonald v. Goddard Grocery Co., 184 Mo. App. 432, 171 S.W. 650 (1914).
15 Ibid.
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The subtle distinctions are important, however, because the fate of the remain-
ing tortfeasors hinges on whether -the document is construed as a release or as a
covenant; if a release, they too are released; if a covenant, they may still be sued.
The release concept has its origin in medieval law, beginning with the notion
that joint tortfeasors were individuals who acted in concert; and because they were
"two acting as one," the injury produced was single and indivisible as to them.
This was coupled with the common-sense rule that a person should not be able to
have more than one satisfaction for his injury. Taken together they form the basis
of the present release rule.16
The difficulty is that, in merging these principles, the courts refused to dis-
tinguish between satisfaction and recovery. Fear of dual satisfaction gave rise to
the rule, thus foreclosing a plaintiff who received a judgment against joint tort-
feasors for $1,000 from recovering the full $1,000 from each of -the defendants.
This practical safeguard to avoid unjust enrichment was soon confused with the
possibility of allowing more than one recovery, so that even if the claimant only
received $500 from tortfeasor A, he was still barred from recovering anything fur-
ther from tortfeasor B, the rationale being that, after all, this was an invisible
injury and he did recover once on the action. The fact that the recovery did not
amount to satisfaction apparently made no difference. Under present application
the rule becomes even more incongruous since it is uniformly held that any amount
received from one tortfeasor must be credited pro tanto to all the others. It is
now entirely impossible for a claimant to collect more than the amount of his
judgment.'
7
In due course it became obvious that innumerable claimants were being done
an injustice when they signed a release of one tortfeasor, reserving the right to sue
the others, only to have the court declare that, whether they liked it or not, they
had released the others. To meet this need the covenant not to sue was developed.
When properly used it can achieve the claimants' end of settling with one defendant
while reserving his rights against the others.' s
The difficulty arises when the precise form of the covenant is not used. When
this happens the courts are put in the position of having to choose between the
obvious intent of the plaintiff to reserve his rights against the remaining tortfeasors,
and the fact that, either because the document is styled "release' or because, as
in the Price case, it states that the document may be pleaded as a defense, the
writing can be considered a release as to joint tortfeasors who do not join the
agreement.
What courts have done when faced with this problem ranges from Price v.
Baker through various middle positions' 9 to the opposite extreme of McKenna v.
Austin,20 in which Mr. Justice Rutledge stated what the legal writers had long
held, that the release rule is an anachronism which should not be allowed to stand
in the way of justice.21 He repudiated it outright.
But, seemingly, the courts, while agreeing in principle with this far-reaching
decision, were unwilling to apply it in their own jurisdictions, preferring to side-
step the antiquated rule rather than discard it entirely.22 While refusing to go so
16 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Prosser, Joint Torts and Several
Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413 (1937).
17 Ibid.
18 The one state where this is not so is West Virginia, where even an admittedly good
covenant not to sue will still release the remaining tortfeasors. Shortt v. Hudson Sup. & Equip.
Co., 191 Va. 323, 60 S.E.2d 900 (1950).
19 See material cited infra, notes 23, 24.
20 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943). McKenna is clearly the outpost case in the area
of releases, particularly in its outspoken denunciation of the rule. Accord: Stella v. Kaiser,
221 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1955).
21 Cf. note 3, supra.
22 E.g., Breen v. Peca, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958); Judson v. Peoples Bank &
Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954).
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far as to dismiss the compulsory release rule completely, courts have avoided it by
two simple expedients: either by construing any release with a reservation of rights
as being a covenant not to sue,23 or by simply not giving it a name and holding
that the intent of the parties is the controlling factor.
2 4
Taken in this perspective, it appears that Price v. Baker is reflective of an
approach that, while clearly losing ground,25 still has enough life to occasionally
strike an unsuspecting claimant. Price, therefore, is a questionable decision, not
only because the court strictly construed the agreement, but even more basically
because of the approval it impliedly gave to the antiquated and too often unjust
doctrine of automatic release of tortfeasors.
Classen Gramm
23 This is probably the most popular single approach, as it was accepted in England
in the 1892 case of Duck v. Mayeu, 2 Q.B. 511 (1892), successfully transplanted to America
in Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 66 N.E. 133 (1903), and subsequently embodied in RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS § 885 (1939).
24 Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954). By focusing on the intent
of the parties and limiting its other inquiries to establishing whether full satisfaction has
been had, this approach approximates the McKenna approach; neither will allow a tort-
feasor to be released unless it was intended that he be released. However, this approach has
proved more to the liking of the courts than McKenna, because it requires only the ignoring
of the compulsory release rule rather than its complete repudiation.
25 Statutory attacks on the release doctrine have been common, particularly in those
states which have adopted the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AmONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4.
For a comment on such recent legislation, see 33 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 291 (1958).
